Murder conviction amounts to moral turpitude, barring passport renewal under the Passports Act: Rajasthan High Court

Appellant No. 5, convicted under Sections 147, 148, 323/149, 460/149 and 302/149 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment by judgment dated 23 May 2023, sought permission to renew his passport, which had expired on 29 March 2026.

He had disclosed the pending appeal in his renewal application, but the Passport Authority required permission from the competent criminal court.

He submitted that renewal alone would not authorise foreign travel, for which separate court permission would be required.

The Passport Authority opposed the application, relying on Section 6(2)(e) of the Passports Act, 1967, and contending that the 1993 notification concerning Section 6(2)(f) did not apply.

Whether a conviction under Section 302 IPC constitutes conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude under Section 6(2)(e) of the Passports Act, 1967

Whether the Court could permit renewal of the applicant’s passport, or grant relief from the statutory restrictions, in light of Sections 6(2)(e) and 6(2)(f) and the 25 August 1993 notification

Section 6(2)(e) of the Passports Act requires refusal of a passport where, within the preceding five years, the applicant has been convicted in India of an offence involving moral turpitude and sentenced to imprisonment for at least two years; Section 6(2)(f) concerns criminal proceedings pending before an Indian criminal court.

In State Bank of India & Ors. v. P. Soupramaniane, (2019) 18 SCC 135, the Supreme Court explained that moral turpitude depends on the facts and circumstances, including whether the act shocks society’s moral conscience, the motive, and whether it reflects depravity of character; aggravated violence involving a dangerous weapon capable of causing death may qualify.

The Central Government’s notification dated 25 August 1993 exempts applicants from Section 6(2)(f), subject to conditions including production of a court order permitting departure from India; it does not provide a corresponding exemption from Section 6(2)(e).

The applicant’s conviction under Section 302/149 IPC and life sentence fell within the five-year period specified in Section 6(2)(e).

Applying the principles in P. Soupramaniane, the Court held that a Section 302 conviction involves aggravated assault accompanied by the requisite criminal intention and therefore falls within offences involving moral turpitude.

The Court distinguished Section 6(2)(f), which addresses pending allegations, from Section 6(2)(e), which applies following conviction.

Because the 1993 notification relaxes only Section 6(2)(f) and no equivalent relaxation applies to clause (e), the Court held that it could not grant the requested relief in a manner that would disregard the statutory restriction.

It held that the conviction under Section 302/149 IPC attracted Section 6(2)(e), and that the notification relating to Section 6(2)(f) did not provide a basis to relax that restriction.

The applicant was left at liberty to pursue any other appropriate remedy available in law.