Music Composer Cannot Assign Rights in Lyrics or Sound Recordings Vested in Film Producers

The Appellant (a renowned music composer) filed a review petition against the High Court’s judgment dated May 21, 2026.

The original dispute concerned the use of the song "En Iniya Pon Nilave" from the film Moodu Pani by Vels Film International Ltd (VFIL) in a new film ‘Aghathiyaa’.

The Respondent (Saregama) claimed copyright ownership.

The Appellant contended that the court’s previous judgment erroneously injuncted him from using the sound recording, which he claimed was not the subject of the controversy, and that the court went beyond the findings of the Single Judge regarding "recreation" versus "adaptation" of musical works.

1. Whether there is an error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment dated May 21, 2026, regarding the injunction on sound recordings.

2. Whether the distinction between "recreation" and "adaptation" of a musical work constitutes a valid ground for review under the Copyright Act.

The court applied Section 2(f) of the Copyright Act, 1957, which defines "cinematograph film" to include sound recordings accompanying the visual recording.

It relied on Section 17, Proviso (b), stating that the producer is the first owner of copyright in a soundtrack/sound recording forming part of a cinematograph film.

It further applied Section 14(1)(a) and 14(1)(v), regarding the limits of a composer's rights in musical works once incorporated into a film.

The principles of Review Jurisdiction, which prohibit revisiting the correctness of a legal view unless there is an error apparent from the record.

The Court rejected the Appellant's argument that it had exceeded the Single Judge's findings. It observed that the Single Judge had already explicitly held that the music composer, under Section 17, Proviso (b), exhausts his rights in the sound recording once it is part of a cinematograph film.

The Court reasoned that since the definition of "cinematograph film" under Section 2(f) inherently includes the sound recording, the Appellant had no authority to license or assign rights in the lyrics or the sound recording to VFIL.

Regarding the distinction between "recreation" and "adaptation," the Court held this was a "distinction without a difference" because the Copyright Act does not recognize "recreation" as a separate, permissible category of activity independent of adaptation.

Any challenge to this interpretation was deemed a challenge to the correctness of the judgment, which cannot be entertained in a review petition.

It affirmed the Single Judge's order requiring a deposit of Rs. 30 Lac for the continued use of the song, failing which an injunction would operate.

The Review Petition was dismissed.