### Natural Justice and the Power to Condonate Must Be Read Into Rule 7(2) of the 2024 Prison Rules. Summary: The High Court of Bombay (Circuit Bench at Kolhapur) addressed a challenge by a life convict whose furlough application was rejected due to a 370-day overstay. The Court scrutinized Rule 7(2) of the Maharashtra Prisons (Furlough and Parole) Rules, 2024, which mandates fixed periods of ineligibility for prisoners who fail to surrender on time. The Court held that the mechanical application of Rule 7(2) without providing the prisoner an opportunity to explain the delay—and without the authority's power to reduce or waive the ineligibility period for "sufficient cause"—violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Drawing on established precedents (*Sunil Batra*, *Asfaq*, and *Kanitlal Nandlal Jaiswal*), the Court emphasized that furlough is a reformative measure aimed at maintaining family ties and human dignity. Consequently, the Court ruled that Section 48-A of the Prisons Act, 1894, which requires a show-cause notice and consideration of the prisoner's explanation, must be read into Rule 7(2). The impugned order of the DIG and the order of permanent forfeiture of remission were quashed because the petitioner’s explanation (concerning his father’s illness and death) was ignored. The matter was remanded for a fresh, speaking order after a fair hearing.

The Petitioner, convicted under Sections 302, 307, and 452 of the IPC, was originally awarded a death sentence, which the Supreme Court later commuted to 25 years of actual imprisonment.

Having undergone over 16 years of actual imprisonment, the Petitioner was released on COVID-19 pandemic parole on 06.08.2020 but failed to surrender on time, returning after a delay of 370 days.

the Deputy Inspector General of Prisons (DIG) rejected his furlough application on 11.06.2024 based on Rule 4(10) of the 1959 Rules.

on 26.12.2024, the DIG imposed a punishment of permanent forfeiture of remission under Section 48-A of the Prisons Act, 1894, without considering the Petitioner’s detailed explanation regarding his father’s illness and subsequent death.

Section 48-A of the Prisons Act, 1894 (Bombay Amendment), which mandates that punishment for overstaying leave can only be awarded "after obtaining [the prisoner's] explanation".

constitutional mandates of Articles 14 and 21 as interpreted in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, holding that prisoners retain fundamental rights and must be protected against procedural unfairness.

the "reformative theory" of sentencing from Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan, which characterizes parole and furlough as humanistic tools for social re-integration.

principle from C.B. Gautam v. Union of India that principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem) must be read into statutory provisions that entail adverse civil consequences, even if the statute is silent.

The Court observed that Rule 7(2) of the 2024 Rules, which mechanically bars furlough eligibility for fixed periods (1 to 5 years) due to overstaying, is arbitrary because it lacks a mechanism for considering a prisoner's explanation.

The Court reasoned that a prisoner who overstays due to a "sufficient cause" (e.g., a serious accident or family tragedy) cannot be treated the same as a wilful defaulter without violating Article 14.

Regarding the DIG's order under Section 48-A, the Court found it legally flawed as it merely acknowledged the receipt of the Petitioner's explanation but dismissed it as "not satisfactory" without any substantive discussion or consideration of the merits regarding his father's hospitalization and death.

The Court concluded that Rule 7(2) must be read in conjunction with the principles of natural justice and Section 48-A to allow the authorities the discretion to waive or reduce the bar on furlough if sufficient cause is shown.

The Court quashed the order dated 11.06.2024 rejecting the furlough and the order dated 26.12.2024 forfeiting remission. The DIG was directed to decide the Petitioner’s applications afresh by passing a "Speaking Order" after duly considering the Petitioner's explanation for the 370-day delay.