NCLAT lacks jurisdiction to condone appeals filed beyond the 45-day limit under Section 61(2) IBC.

The appellant challenged the NCLT, Indore Bench’s order dated 17 April 2026 passed in CP (IB) No. 60 of 2021.

The order was pronounced in the appellant’s presence, but the appellant claimed that his erstwhile counsel did not promptly communicate it to him.

He applied for a certified copy on 19 May 2026 and subsequently filed the appeal electronically on 29 June 2026, together with an application seeking condonation of a 43-day delay.

The respondent opposed the application, arguing that the appeal was filed beyond the statutory 30-day period and the maximum additional 15-day condonable period under Section 61(2) of the IBC.

Whether the appellant’s application for condonation of a 43-day delay was maintainable under the proviso to Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, where the appeal was filed beyond the aggregate period of 30 days plus 15 days?

Whether the appellant could rely on the date of applying for or receiving the certified copy to extend or postpone limitation, despite applying for the copy after expiry of the initial 30-day limitation period?

Section 61(1) and (2) of the IBC prescribes a 30-day limitation period for appeals from NCLT orders, with power to condone delay only for a further period not exceeding 15 days upon sufficient cause; delay beyond this outer limit is not condonable.

In V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Ltd., the Supreme Court held that limitation under the IBC begins from the pronouncement of the order, unlike Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, and that an aggrieved party must diligently apply for a certified copy; under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, only the time requisite for obtaining the copy after such application may be excluded.

Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules requires an appeal to be accompanied by a certified copy of the impugned order, but this procedural requirement does not postpone commencement of limitation.

The Tribunal also relied on Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee, which reaffirmed that the NCLAT has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory period of 30 days plus 15 days.

The appellant’s reliance on Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd. was rejected as inapplicable because that decision concerned Section 421(3) of the Companies Act and not the distinct limitation framework under Section 61(2) of the IBC.

The Tribunal held that the impugned order was pronounced on 17 April 2026, and limitation therefore commenced on 18 April 2026.

The initial 30-day period expired on 17 May 2026, while the maximum condonable period expired on 1 June 2026.

Although the appellant claimed to have applied for a certified copy on 19 May 2026, that application was made after the expiry of the statutory 30-day period and, in any event, no documentary proof of the application was produced.

The appellant’s lack of prompt knowledge due to counsel’s alleged failure to communicate the order did not alter the statutory commencement of limitation, particularly because the appellant was represented before the NCLT when the order was pronounced.

Since the appeal was filed on 29 June 2026—43 days beyond the prescribed 30-day period and beyond the outer 15-day condonable limit—the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to condone the delay, irrespective of the explanation offered.

Consequently, Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) No. 1324 of 2026 was also dismissed as time-barred.