No misconduct arises from failing to implement a judicial direction stayed upon receipt.

The applicant, then SHO of Police Station Hauz Khas, was charged with failing to register an FIR within 48 hours as directed by a Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Magistrate had directed the complainant to obtain and serve a copy of the order on the SHO, but the respondents did not dispute that the complainant had not done so.

The order was received at the police station by post on 5 April 2021; on that same date, an Additional Sessions Judge stayed its operation.

The revision petition was dismissed on 5 May 2021.

The applicant was transferred from the police station on 25 July 2021, before subsequent proceedings before the High Court concluded.

The FIR was ultimately registered by his successor in 2023.

The applicant challenged the charge memorandum dated 19 May 2025 and the summary of allegations dated 1 January 2025.

1. Whether the allegations in the charge memorandum, taken as framed, disclosed misconduct by the applicant warranting continuation of departmental proceedings.

2. Whether the Tribunal could interfere with the charge memorandum at the threshold, notwithstanding the respondents’ contention that the application was premature.

Under Section 156(3) CrPC, a Magistrate may direct the police to register an FIR.

Relying on Union of India v. Upendra Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 357, the Tribunal stated that a court or tribunal may interfere with a charge memorandum where the charge, read with its particulars, does not disclose misconduct or is contrary to law; it must not ordinarily determine the truth of the allegations at that stage.

Union of India v. Ashok Kacker, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 180, establishes that a charge memorandum should not ordinarily be challenged prematurely, particularly before the employee has submitted a reply.

Under State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna, (2001) 2 SCC 330, interference may be justified in appropriate circumstances, including mala fides, bias, or a proceeding that would otherwise be an empty formality.

The Tribunal found that the Magistrate’s order was received at the police station on 5 April 2021, the very day its operation was stayed.

The applicant therefore could not properly be faulted for failing to act on an order whose operation was then stayed.

Although the revision was dismissed on 5 May 2021, the applicant was transferred before the later High Court proceedings concluded and before the Magistrate recorded, on 19 October 2021, that no stay was operating.

The respondents’ suggestion that the Naib Court had informed the applicant was unsupported by evidence; the available statement instead showed receipt of the order by post on 5 April 2021.

On those circumstances, the allegations did not disclose misconduct, and threshold interference was warranted despite the general rule against premature challenges to charge memoranda.

It quashed and set aside both documents and directed the respondents to drop the departmental proceedings.

Any consequential benefits admissible under the applicable rules were to be granted within three weeks of receipt of the order, having regard to the applicant’s impending retirement.

There was no order as to costs.