No-work-no-pay does not apply where an employee is prevented from working by the employer.

The petitioner was appointed as a 4th Peon in Putineswar High School on 14 December 1991 and was subsequently adjusted as a 2nd Peon in Heramba Chandra Academy, Bhograi, by order dated 7 September 1998.

The Inspector of Schools cancelled his appointment and approval on 25 June 2001. The Odisha Administrative Tribunal initially quashed the cancellation for violation of natural justice and permitted continuation in service, but denied back wages on the principle of “No Work No Pay”.

The petitioner was again terminated on 11 March 2013 after a hearing. In W.P.(C) (OAC) No. 2701 of 2014, the High Court quashed the termination and directed the District Education Officer, Balasore, to approve his appointment against the post of 4th Peon, holding that the post was admissible under the applicable yardstick.

The State’s writ appeal was dismissed.

Pursuant to the High Court’s directions, the District Education Officer restored approval of the petitioner’s appointment with effect from 19 May 1995, but limited arrear salary to the period during which he had actually performed duty.

The petitioner had retired on 31 March 2020. He therefore challenged the denial of salary and consequential benefits for the intervening periods during which he had been prevented from working.

Whether the principle of “No Work No Pay” applied where the petitioner did not work because his appointment had been cancelled and he was prevented by the authorities from discharging his duties.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to arrear salary and consequential service benefits for the period between cancellation of approval and his superannuation, despite not having actually worked during that period.

The Court applied the principle that “No Work No Pay” does not operate where an employee was willing to work but was prevented from doing so by the employer or competent authority.

Relying on Srikantha S.M. v. Bharath Earth Movers Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 314, and the authorities cited therein, including J.N. Srivastava, Shambhu Murari Sinha, and Balram Gupta, the Court held that an employee kept out of service unlawfully is entitled to salary and other consequential benefits.

It also relied on Shantilata Pattanaik v. Swaminathan Research Foundation, 2012 (2) ILR-CUT-914, where this Court awarded arrears of salary and other pecuniary benefits when the employee was prevented from working through no fault of her own.

The earlier directions concerning approval of the petitioner’s appointment were based on Rajendra Kumar Das and Deepak Kumar Sahoo, under which the petitioner’s appointment against the 4th Peon post was held valid and required approval under the applicable yardstick.

The petitioner’s appointment had ultimately been approved retrospectively from 19 May 1995 until his retirement.

Although he did not perform duties after 25 June 2001, the record showed that his absence resulted from cancellation of approval by the authority, not from wilful absence or refusal to work.

Since the petitioner had been prevented from discharging his duties while pursuing legal remedies for restoration of his appointment, the Court found that no fault could be attributed to him.

Applying Srikantha S.M. and Shantilata Pattanaik, the Court held that the “No Work No Pay” principle could not be invoked by the State to deny salary for a period during which the authorities themselves had kept the petitioner out of service.

The Court also noted that the State neither alleged wilful non-attendance nor contended that the petitioner had been gainfully employed elsewhere.

The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to salary and consequential service benefits for the periods during which he had been prevented from working, namely from March 1996 to 6 September 1998 and from 25 June 2001 until 31 March 2020, along with other consequential service benefits.

The opposite parties were directed to release those financial benefits to the petitioner.