Non-application of the Easements Act does not bar applying its underlying equitable principles.

The respondent brought a suit seeking recognition of an easementary right to use a pathway from her house to the Government road, and a perpetual injunction against its obstruction.

The trial court found that the pathway existed when the respondent purchased her land, that the deeds described the pathway and its connection to the Government road, and that no other access had been established. It decreed the suit on the basis of an implied easement of necessity; the first appellate court affirmed.

In the second appeal, the appellant contended that the Indian Easements Act, 1882 did not apply in Tripura and that the courts below therefore erred in relying on it.

1. Whether the non-application of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 in Tripura precludes a court from applying the principles underlying the Act as principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

2. Whether the concurrent finding that the respondent had an easementary right to use the pathway was perverse or otherwise liable to be set aside in the second appeal.

The Court considered Section 12 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, invoked in the suit as the basis for the claimed easementary right, while recognising that the Act does not apply in Tripura.

Relying on Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, (1997) 4 SCC 713, it held that a court cannot treat a statutory provision of an Act that does not apply in a State as operative there; however, the principles of justice, equity and good conscience underlying that provision may be applied to the circumstances of a case.

The Court also referred to Umesh Chandra Goswami v. Pachu Gopal Barua, (1998) 1 GLR 310, and the cited Calcutta High Court decisions for the application of such underlying principles where the Act does not apply.

The Court distinguished applying the Easements Act itself from applying equitable principles underlying it: the Act’s non-application did not bar the latter.

On the evidence, the courts below had found that the pathway was described in the 2006 deed, connected to a lane leading to the Government road, and existed when the respondent purchased the land in 2007; they also found that the appellant had not shown that the respondent had another route of access.

The High Court held that these findings supported the recognition of an implied easement of necessity and were based on appreciation of evidence, not shown to be perverse.

Finding no perversity in the concurrent findings recognising the respondent’s easementary right and granting an injunction, the Court dismissed the second appeal without costs and disposed of any pending applications.