Non-mention of employees’ names in a Special Officer’s report cannot disprove their service or justify denial of approval.

Sukchar Swami Mahadebnanda Junior High School was established in 1966, recognised with effect from 1 January 1971, temporarily closed in 1976, and resumed functioning in 1984.

A District Level Inspection Team recommended revival of its recognition in 1988.

The appellants were appointed as the Headmistress, Assistant Teachers and Clerk between May 1995 and May 1997 and claimed to have continuously served the school thereafter.

The Managing Committee’s resolution dated 26 February 2000 recorded their names and resolved to seek approval of their services if the school’s recognition was revived.

Pursuant to earlier writ and contempt proceedings, the school’s recognition was ultimately revived with effect from 1 May 2009.

Although the appellants’ services were approved on more than one occasion, those approvals were subsequently set aside or withdrawn, and the authorities repeatedly rejected their claim, principally because their names did not appear in the 1988 DLIT report and in the Special Officer’s report prepared after an inspection in 2002.

The Secretary rejected the claim by order dated 30 January 2019, and the learned Single Judge dismissed the appellants’ challenge, holding that their actual service and the legality of their appointments had not been established and that the Special Officer’s report created serious doubt regarding their employment.

1. Whether the non-mentioning of the appellants’ names in the Special Officer’s report dated 4 September 2002 was sufficient evidence that they were absent from the school or had not been appointed as its teaching and non-teaching staff?

2. Whether the Special Officer’s report, merely because it was not challenged and was said to have attained finality, was sufficient to conclude that the appellants were never employed by the school?

3. Whether the appellants were required to establish their claim beyond reasonable doubt, or whether the authorities were required to determine the claim on the ordinary civil and administrative standard of preponderance of probabilities after considering all relevant materials?

The Court held that a court-appointed Commissioner or Special Officer performs a fact-gathering and ministerial, not adjudicatory, function; the report is prima facie evidence whose weight must be assessed in light of the officer’s mandate and the entire evidentiary record, as recognised in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161, M.P. Rajya Tilhan Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Maryadit v. Modi Transport Services, (2022) 14 SCC 345, and Amena Bibi v. Sk. Abdul Haque, AIR 1997 Cal 59.

Administrative determination of the appellants’ claim was governed by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the authority was required to consider relevant and cogent materials collectively, as stated in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi, (1991) 2 SCC 716.

The Court further applied the distinction between illegal and irregular appointments and held that long-serving employees should not be denied relief merely for procedural irregularities where the appointments were not shown to be illegal, relying on Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826, Prabir Kumar Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, SLP (C) No. 27804 of 2019, and Rakhal Chandra Das v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 Cal LT 330.

It also relied on Hemoprova Sikdar v. State of West Bengal, (1998) WBLR (Cal) 223, and Niranjan Sahoo v. State of West Bengal, FMA No. 2089 of 2015, for the principle that organising schools functioning before the statutory recruitment regime could not necessarily be judged by later recruitment rules.

The Special Officer had been directed only to inspect the school building, its rooms and structural condition, and to estimate the approximate number of students; he had not been directed to identify the teaching or non-teaching staff, verify appointment letters, examine attendance registers, or determine the legality of appointments.

The report named the Headmaster and two persons claiming to be Managing Committee members but referred to the remaining persons merely as four teachers and two non-teaching staff members, without naming any of them.

Its silence regarding the appellants was therefore general and did not amount to a finding that they were absent or never employed.

The fact that the report was not challenged did not make it conclusive, particularly since it contained no adverse finding requiring challenge.

The authorities also wrongly relied on the 1988 DLIT report, since the appellants were appointed only between 1995 and 1997 and their names could not logically have appeared in a report prepared years earlier.

The appointment letters, the Managing Committee’s resolution dated 26 February 2000, the subsequent representation naming the appellants, attendance records and other materials had to be assessed collectively on the preponderance-of-probabilities standard.

Since the Managing Committee’s authority and the genuineness of the appellants’ documents had not been shown to be fraudulent or fabricated, the appointments could not be rejected merely for non-compliance with recruitment procedures applicable after recognition.

It held that the Special Officer’s report neither established their absence from the school nor disproved their appointments, and that the authorities had applied an erroneous standard of proof while failing to consider the relevant materials collectively.

The appeal was allowed; the Single Judge’s judgment dated 21 December 2023 and the Secretary’s order dated 30 January 2019 were set aside.

The respondent authorities were directed to approve the appellants’ appointments in their respective posts with effect from 1 May 2009, the date on which the school’s recognition was revived.

The authorities were permitted to verify the originals of the appointment letters, qualifications and credentials within six weeks, without reopening the Court’s findings; where any appellant had retired, revised retiral and pensionary benefits were directed to be paid within twelve weeks thereafter.

No order as to costs was made.