Officers on electoral revision duty are deemed on deputation and cannot be transferred without Election Commission approval.

Respondent No. 1, a Block Development Officer, was assigned additional charge as In-charge CEO, Janpad Panchayat Berla.

On 28.11.2025, the Collector-cum-District Election Officer appointed him as Additional Assistant Electoral Registration Officer for Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls.

On 16.12.2025, the State transferred Respondent No. 1 to Zila Panchayat Bemetara and moved the Appellant to his previous post.

Respondent No. 1 challenged this transfer, alleging it violated statutory bars against transferring election-duty staff.

A Single Judge set aside the transfer on 05.02.2026.

The Appellant (the substituted officer) filed this intra-court appeal, arguing the transfer was already fully implemented and administrative arrangements were finalized.

The Court primarily applied Section 13CC of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, which mandates that any staff employed for the preparation or revision of electoral rolls is deemed to be on deputation to the Election Commission and subject to its exclusive control and discipline.

It also relied on Article 324 of the Constitution of India, which vests the superintendence and control of elections in the Election Commission.

Centrally, the Court followed the principle from Kanhaiya Prasad Sinha v. Union of India (AIR 1990 Pat 189), establishing that the State is constitutionally obligated to comply with the lawful directions of the Election Commission.

The Court reasoned that once Respondent No. 1 was appointed for SIR work on 28.11.2025, he was "deemed to be on deputation" to the Election Commission under Section 13CC.

Consequently, the State lost its unilateral power to transfer him.

The Court emphasized a communication dated 27.10.2025 from the Chief Electoral Officer, which explicitly advised the State not to transfer officers engaged in SIR without prior permission.

The Court rejected the Appellant’s argument that "full implementation" of the transfer (joining the new post) protected the order, holding that an order issued in contravention of a statutory mandate involves an inherent lack of jurisdiction that cannot be cured by being acted upon.

Furthermore, the Court dismissed the plea of delay, noting that technicalities cannot defeat substantive justice when a statutory provision is violated.

The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal and affirmed the Single Judge's order setting aside the transfer of Respondent No. 1.

No costs were ordered.