Order rejecting Section 156(3) application is a revisable final order, precluding invocation of extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

The Petitioner, Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd., filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) [now Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS)] before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bandra, seeking a direction for the police to register an FIR regarding an alleged economic offence.

This application followed a prior procedural history where the police had closed a preliminary inquiry citing the dispute as civil in nature, a decision which the Petitioner had unsuccessfully challenged before the High Court and the Supreme Court.

On July 22, 2024, the Magistrate rejected the Petitioner’s 156(3) application (the "impugned order").

The Petitioner then filed the present Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 of the CrPC to set aside the rejection, rather than filing a Criminal Revision Application before the Sessions Court.

1. Whether a Writ Petition under Article 226 or an application under Section 482 CrPC is entertainable against a Magistrate's order rejecting an application under Section 156(3) CrPC when an efficacious alternate remedy of revision is available.

2. Whether the High Court should entertain a challenge to a revisable order directly, bypassing the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sessions Court.

The court relied on the principle that an order passed under Section 156(3) CrPC (Section 175(3) BNSS) is a "final order" because it terminates the specific proceeding before the Magistrate, making it subject to revision under Section 397 CrPC (Section 438 BNSS) rather than being a non-revisable interlocutory order.

It applied the doctrine from Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P., which mandates that when a statute provides an efficacious alternate remedy, the High Court should ordinarily exercise self-restraint and decline writ jurisdiction.

Furthermore, based on Tejram Gaikwad v. Sunanda Gaikwad, the court affirmed that where concurrent revisional jurisdiction exists between the Sessions Court and the High Court, the aggrieved party must ordinarily approach the inferior court first.

The court distinguished between the "maintainability" and "entertainability" of a writ petition, noting that while the High Court has the power to hear the matter, it should exercise discretion to refuse when a statutory remedy exists.

The court observed that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstances—such as a violation of natural justice or an order wholly without jurisdiction—that would warrant bypassing the Sessions Court.

The court rejected the Petitioner's argument that the "palpably erroneous" nature of the order necessitated extraordinary intervention, reiterating its recent decision in Bipasha Deepak Kumar v. State of Maharashtra, which held that the proper forum for such grievances is the Revisional Court.

The court emphasized that the Revisional Court is fully competent to examine the legality and propriety of the Magistrate’s refusal to order an investigation.

It held that the impugned order is a final, revisable order under Section 438 of the BNSS.

To ensure the interest of justice, the court directed that if the Petitioner files a Criminal Revision Application before the Sessions Court within four weeks, it must be entertained on its merits without insisting on an application for condonation of delay, excluding the time spent during the pendency of this Writ Petition.

All contentions on the merits of the case were kept open for the revisional proceedings.