Order VI Rule 17 amendments after trial commencement require due diligence; unexplained delay warrants rejection.

The petitioner-plaintiff instituted Title Suit No. 13/2022 seeking declaration of right, title and interest, recovery of khas possession, permanent injunction, cancellation of mutation and consequential reliefs concerning land measuring 14 Bigha 1 Katha 19 Lechas.

The defendants asserted in their written statement dated 28 November 2022 that the petitioner had earlier sold 9 Bigha 16 Lechas of the suit land to Ramesh Chandra Ojha through Sale Deed No. 4623/69 dated 3 June 1969, and that Bibi Bala Ojha had subsequently transferred part of the land to the defendants.

After issues had been framed and the plaintiff’s evidence-on-affidavit had been filed, the plaintiff applied under Order VI Rule 17 CPC on 13 February 2024 to amend the plaint.

The proposed amendments included a challenge to the alleged sale deed as forged, correction of names and boundaries, and incorporation of a plea that the land fell within a Tribal Belt and that the transfer was void.

The trial court rejected the amendment application on the ground of lack of due diligence. The plaintiff challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the plaintiff had demonstrated the due diligence required under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC to seek amendment after commencement of trial?

2. Whether the trial court’s rejection of the amendment application warranted interference by the High Court in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution?

The Court applied Order VI Rule 17 CPC, particularly its proviso, which bars amendment after commencement of trial unless the party establishes that, despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised earlier.

The Court relied on Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders (P) Ltd., (2022) 16 SCC 1, for the principles that amendments necessary for determining the real controversy should ordinarily be allowed, but not where they introduce a time-barred or entirely new case, alter the nature of the suit, cause prejudice, or are mala fide.

It also considered Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480, Vidyabai v. Padmalatha, (2009) 2 SCC 409, and Pandit Malhari Mahale v. Monika Pandit Mahale, (2020) 11 SCC 549, concerning the mandatory effect of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 after commencement of trial.

The Court further held that Article 227 jurisdiction does not justify interference where the trial court’s decision is legally permissible and not erroneous.

The Court accepted that amendment jurisdiction is generally exercised liberally, but held that the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 must first be satisfied where trial has commenced.

The plaintiff became aware of the alleged Sale Deed No. 4623/69 when the written statement was filed on 28 November 2022, yet applied for its certified copy only on 23 November 2023 and filed the amendment application on 13 February 2024.

By that time, issues had been framed and the plaintiff’s evidence-on-affidavit had already been filed, with cross-examination scheduled.

The explanation that the plaintiff was waiting for the defendants to produce the sale deed was found unacceptable, particularly because the defendants had not relied on or filed the document with their written statement and the original defendant No. 3 was proceeding ex parte.

The Court therefore concluded that the plaintiff could have sought the amendments earlier through reasonable diligence and that the statutory condition in the proviso was not met.

Consequently, no jurisdictional error or perversity was found in the trial court’s order warranting interference under Article 227.

The rejection of the amendment application by the trial court was upheld, and CRP(IO)/297/2024 was dismissed.

The stay on further proceedings in Title Suit No. 13/2022 was vacated, and the trial court was directed to proceed with the suit and conclude it at the earliest.

The parties were directed to bear their own costs.