Order XVIII Rule 17 cannot be invoked to introduce fresh evidence or fill evidentiary lacunae.

The petitioner, Plaintiff No.2 in C.S. No.178 of 2012, instituted a partition suit concerning the suit properties and sought permanent injunction against Defendant Nos.6 to 10, the alleged purchasers.

On 10 July 2025, he filed evidence by affidavit and was examined as P.W.1; his examination-in-chief was completed, twenty documents were exhibited, and he was partly cross-examined by Defendant Nos.6 and 7.

During the interval before completion of his cross-examination, he filed an application under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC seeking recall of P.W.1 to prove a compromise petition and a Kaccha Farad dated 20 November 2018 and to have them marked as exhibits.

The trial court rejected the application on 1 August 2025, holding that Order XVIII Rule 17 could not be used to recall a partly cross-examined witness for further examination-in-chief to introduce and prove new documents.

The petitioner challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether a plaintiff may invoke Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC to recall himself as a witness, while his cross-examination remains incomplete, for further examination-in-chief to prove documents not introduced during the original examination-in-chief.

Whether the trial court’s refusal to recall P.W.1 disclosed any jurisdictional error or other infirmity warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the disputed compromise petition and Kaccha Farad could justify recall when their admissibility and genuineness were themselves contested and they had not been admitted by the trial court.

Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC confers a discretionary power on the court to recall an examined witness and put questions necessary to clarify doubts or issues arising from the evidence already led; it is not intended to permit a party to reopen evidence, conduct further examination-in-chief or cross-examination, introduce additional material, or fill omissions and lacunae.

The power must be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate or exceptional cases.

The Court relied on Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar (Dead) through LRs v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate, (2009) 4 SCC 410, and K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, (2011) 11 SCC 275, which caution against using Order XVIII Rule 17 or Section 151 CPC routinely to prolong proceedings or repair deficiencies in evidence.

It also relied on Gayathri v. M. Girish, (2016) 14 SCC 142, concerning the need for compelling and acceptable reasons for reopening evidence.

Shubhakaran Singh v. Abhayraj Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1028, and K. Bharathamma v. Bandaru Sakku Bai, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1484, which reiterate that the provision is primarily an aid to the court for clarification and cannot be employed by a party to improve or embellish its evidence.

The High Court held that the petitioner’s application was not for clarification of evidence already recorded but for introducing and proving the compromise petition and Kaccha Farad for the first time after his examination-in-chief had concluded and while cross-examination was pending.

Such a request fell outside the limited purpose of Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC and amounted to an attempt to supplement or improve the petitioner’s case.

The fact that the petitioner had not been formally discharged from the witness box, or that the defendants could subsequently cross-examine him, did not create a right to recall or cure the procedural defect.

The disputed documents had also not been admitted by the trial court, and their genuineness, legality and effect were specifically challenged by the defendants through applications under Section 151 CPC.

Consequently, permitting their introduction through recall would risk prejudice and prolongation of the trial rather than assist the court in clarifying existing evidence.

The CMP was dismissed, and the refusal to recall P.W.1 under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC was upheld.

The trial court was directed to endeavour to conclude the suit, pending since 2012, preferably within four months from receipt of the authenticated judgment.

Any interim order previously passed was vacated.