P&H HC Discharges Raghu Murder Accused: Village Tip Was Hearsay, Approver Named Two Other Companions

Raghu was murdered in June 2012.

The complainant’s initial statement identified Rajiv Dass and two unnamed companions; a later supplementary statement named Alok Kumar Shah, stating only that he had learned Shah’s name “at his own level and from his village.”

Shah was charged under Sections 302 and 120-B IPC.

The prosecution’s approver, Yogesh Kumar, named Rajiv and Bharat Jha as the other persons present but did not name Shah.

The Sessions Court framed charges against Shah, and he challenged that order in revision.

During the revision proceedings, the Court also considered testimony recorded before the trial had been stayed as to Shah.

Under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC, the court must apply its judicial mind and sift the prosecution material to determine whether it discloses a prima facie case or grave suspicion; it must not conduct a trial or assess the material as though deciding guilt.

Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal and Sajjan Kumar v. CBI establish that the court is not a mere post office for the prosecution and may discharge where the material gives rise only to suspicion, rather than grave suspicion.

Under Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, strong suspicion must rest on material capable of being translated into evidence at trial.

Section 60 of the Evidence Act requires oral evidence to be direct; hearsay is generally inadmissible, as explained in Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri.

Revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC may be exercised where, among other grounds, material evidence has been ignored or the decision is grossly erroneous, as stated in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander.

The Court noted that, because the revision was instituted in 2016, the matter remained governed by the CrPC under Section 531 BNSS.

The only investigative material naming Shah was the complainant’s supplementary statement, which did not identify him from personal knowledge and attributed the information to an unnamed source.

The Court held that this hearsay could not provide a sound basis for grave suspicion.

The complainant had not identified Shah during investigation and later acknowledged that he first saw Shah after the occurrence when Shah was produced in court.

The approver’s statement, available when charges were framed, named Rajiv and Bharat Jha and did not mention Shah; the Court found that the trial court had failed to consider this material.

The subsequent testimony also disclosed no independent source for the allegation against Shah.

The trial court’s general reference to the police record and supplementary statement, without evaluating these matters, amounted to non-application of mind and justified revisional intervention.

It allowed the revision, set aside the order framing charges against Shah under Sections 302 and 120-B IPC, and discharged him; his bail and surety bonds, if any, were discharged.