P&H HC Upholds Tenant’s Eviction For Landlady’s Son’s Water-Purifier Venture, As Alleged Watch-And-Mobile Business Shift To Ground Floor Didn’t By Itself End Need

The tenant challenged concurrent orders directing his eviction from a first-floor shop in Hisar on the landlady’s ground of bona fide personal necessity under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973.

The landlady had purchased the property in 2009 and sought the shop for her son, Naveen Kumar, to establish a business selling water purifiers and allied products.

The tenant disputed the need, alleging other available accommodation and concealment of existing business premises.

During the appeal, he sought to amend his written statement, alleging that after the landlady’s husband died, Naveen Kumar had shifted his watches-and-mobiles business to a ground-floor portion of the building.

The Appellate Authority dismissed the amendment application and affirmed eviction; the tenant challenged both orders in revision.

Under Sections 13 and 15(6) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, a landlord’s bona fide requirement must be genuine and assessed in light of the circumstances, while the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction permits review of the legality, propriety, and correctness of the authorities’ orders but not a fresh appraisal of evidence merely to substitute another reasonably possible view (*Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh*, (2014) 9 SCC 78).

A landlord seeking premises to establish a business need not prove dire necessity or prior financial arrangements (*Raghunath G. Panhale v. M/s Chaganlal Sundarji and Co.*, (1999) 8 SCC 1); the landlord is ordinarily best placed to judge business requirements, though the need must still be genuine (*M/s Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal*, (2005) 8 SCC 252).

Other accommodation must be assessed for its actual availability and suitability, rather than mere ownership.

A bona fide requirement must continue until final adjudication, and a subsequent event that materially affects its foundation may be considered; however, not every intervening change extinguishes the need (*Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prashad*, 1981 (3) SCC 103; *Kedar Nath Agrawal v. Dhanraji Devi*, (2004) 8 SCC 76; *Prabha Arora v. Brij Mohini Anand*, (2007) 10 SCC 53).

Order VI Rule 17 CPC governs amendments to pleadings; the due-diligence proviso cannot require a party to plead an event before it occurs, but amendment must be necessary to determine the real controversy.

The landlady and her son testified to the proposed independent business, and the authorities below reasonably found their evidence sufficient.

The ground-floor portion was occupied by another son, while Naveen Kumar’s existing watch-repair activity from a small portion did not establish that suitable accommodation was available for the proposed business; the courts had considered the other portions and the alleged concealment.

Although the Appellate Authority’s reliance on the Order VI Rule 17 due-diligence proviso was not an adequate basis for rejecting an amendment concerning later events, the proposed facts did not show that the ground-floor portion was suitable for, or fully met, the requirement for which eviction was sought.

The husband’s death had no direct bearing on the need projected for Naveen Kumar, and shifting an existing business did not, without more, extinguish the claimed requirement.

The amendment therefore disclosed no material subsequent event warranting reopening the matter or demonstrating prejudice.

It dismissed the revision and upheld the eviction order.

The challenge to dismissal of the amendment application was also rejected, subject to the Court’s clarification concerning the reasoning under Order VI Rule 17 CPC.

The mesne-profits application was dismissed as not pressed, and pending miscellaneous applications were disposed of.