Parliamentary mandate under the Reorganization Act validates adaptations to the Public Safety Act for Union Territories.

The petitioner, Tanveer Ahmad Mir, was detained under Section 8(a) of the Jammu Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (PSA) via Order No. 09/DMB/PSA/2025 dated 29.04.2025.

The detention was based on allegations that he was an active Over Ground Worker (OGW) for Lashkar-e-Toiba, providing logistical support and maintaining contact with Pakistan-based handlers.

The petitioner challenged the detention on multiple grounds: that the grounds were a verbatim copy of the police dossier; that the material was not fully supplied; that the "Security of the State" could not be substituted with "Security of the Union Territory" post-2019; and that procedural rules (Rule 33 of Transaction of Business Rules) were violated.

1. Whether the adaptation of the JK Public Safety Act, 1978, substituting "State" with "Union Territory," is constitutionally valid under the JK Reorganization Act, 2019.

2. Whether the substitution of the police dossier into the grounds of detention constitutes a total non-application of mind.

3. Whether the failure to strictly follow Rule 33 of the Transaction of Government Business Rules in granting government approval vitiates the detention.

4. Whether the non-supply of all investigation material resulted in a violation of the constitutional right under Article 22(5).

The court applied Section 95 and 96 of the JK Reorganization Act, 2019, which empowers the Central Government to adapt and modify existing laws to facilitate their application to successor Union Territories.

It relied on Article 22(5) of the Constitution regarding the right to effective representation and Article 21 regarding personal liberty.

Procedurally, it applied Section 8(4) of the PSA concerning government approval of detention orders.

Precedents included Jai Singh v. State of JK regarding non-application of mind, and Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, which establishes that preventive detention is a precautionary power distinct from punitive prosecution and can be invoked even during the pendency of criminal trials.

The court reasoned that the substitution of "Union Territory" for "State" in the PSA was a valid exercise of delegated legislation expressly sanctioned by Parliament under Section 96 of the Reorganization Act.

Regarding the "verbatim reproduction" claim, the court found that while similarities existed, the detaining authority had independently evaluated the detenue’s antecedents, bail status, and recent security threats (e.g., the Pahalgam attack), demonstrating a "conscious" subjective satisfaction.

The court noted that the detaining authority considered material beyond the FIR, including intelligence inputs and proxy network usage.

On procedural grounds, the court held that Rule 33 of Business Rules is an internal regulatory mechanism; since the order was issued "By order of the Government" and the detenue actually submitted a representation, no prejudice was caused.

The court further observed that all relevant documents (25 leaves) were served and explained to the detenue in his local language.

It held that the adaptation of the PSA is constitutionally sound and that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was based on relevant, live material.

The court concluded that the procedural safeguards under Article 22(5) and the PSA were fully complied with, and the detention was necessary to prevent activities prejudicial to the security of the Union Territory; the petition was dismissed and Registry was directed to return the detention records to the respondents.