Parole rejection based on police objections warrants no writ interference absent perversity, while a fresh application remains permissible.

The petitioner, Gangaram Gabel, was undergoing life imprisonment at Central Jail, Bilaspur pursuant to his conviction under Sections 120-B, 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

His criminal appeal had been dismissed, while his Special Leave Petition (Criminal) was pending before the Supreme Court.

He applied for first temporary parole for 16 days under the Chhattisgarh Prisoner’s Leave Rules, 1989, relying on his certified normal/good jail conduct and the availability of two sureties who undertook responsibility for his conduct and timely return.

The Superintendent of Police, Janjgir-Champa, recommended rejection based principally on objections by the local Sarpanch and villagers, including apprehension regarding the petitioner’s proposed stay at Village Lachhanpur, which was not his native village.

On that basis, the Collector and District Magistrate, Janjgir-Champa rejected the parole application by order dated 17 March 2026.

The petitioner challenged the rejection under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and sought release on parole.

Whether the Collector and District Magistrate’s rejection of the petitioner’s temporary parole application, based on the police report and local objections, was arbitrary, mechanical, perverse, or without jurisdiction so as to warrant interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the petitioner’s satisfactory jail conduct and the availability of sureties entitled him to immediate temporary parole for 16 days.

The Court applied Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, under which judicial review of an administrative decision is warranted where the decision is perverse, arbitrary, without jurisdiction, or unsupported by relevant material.

It also applied the Chhattisgarh Prisoner’s Leave Rules, 1989, governing temporary parole and requiring the competent authority to consider the relevant circumstances in accordance with the Rules and applicable law.

The Court recognised that a prisoner’s jail conduct and the availability of reliable sureties are relevant considerations in a parole application, but they do not, by themselves, confer an automatic right to release.

The Court further held that the legality of the impugned order must be assessed on the material available before the competent authority when the decision was made.

The Court noted that the petitioner’s good or normal jail conduct and the sureties’ undertakings were favourable circumstances.

However, the competent authority had considered the police report and objections from local residents concerning the petitioner’s proposed stay in a village other than his native village and his proposed meetings with friends and relatives.

Although the Court did not independently endorse the merits of those objections, it held that the reasons relied upon by the authority could not be characterised, in the circumstances, as perverse or wholly without jurisdiction.

Consequently, the limited scope of writ review did not justify quashing the parole-rejection order.

The petitioner’s favourable jail conduct and sureties were left open for consideration in a fresh application.

The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to submit a fresh parole application before the competent authority.

If such an application is filed, the authority must consider it independently, in accordance with the Chhattisgarh Prisoner’s Leave Rules, 1989, and applicable law.