PENDENCY OF CIVIL LITIGATION DOES NOT BAR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IF INGREDIENTS OF FRAUD ARE PRIMA FACIE ESTABLISHED.

The petitioner filed a petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, seeking to quash FIR No. 29/2022, the subsequent charge-sheet, and the order of framing charges under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The dispute concerns a plot of land the petitioner claims was gifted to him via a Hibanama in 2008 by Respondent No. 4.

The prosecution alleges that the petitioner abused a position of trust to obtain the complainant's signature on stamp papers under the guise of correcting boundary descriptions, which were then used to fabricate the gift deed and mutate the land in his name.

The petitioner contended the matter was purely civil, noting a 16-year delay in the FIR and a pending civil suit where he obtained a temporary injunction.

1. Whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed on the grounds that the dispute is purely civil in nature regarding title and ownership of property.

2. Whether the High Court can meticulously examine the probative value of evidence or adjudicate disputed facts in a petition under Section 528 of the BNSS (formerly Section 482 CrPC).

Section 528 of the BNSS (equivalent to Section 482 of the CrPC) regarding the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law.

Criminal prosecution is not barred by the mere pendency of civil or revenue proceedings if the ingredients of a cognizable offence, particularly deception and fraudulent inducement under Section 420 IPC, are prima facie established.

At the stage of quashing, the court must not conduct a "mini-trial" or weigh the evidence, as factual disputes regarding consent and intent are matters for trial.

The Court observed that the charge-sheet and investigation material primia facie disclosed elements of deception and inducement, which are foundational to Section 420 IPC.

While the petitioner argued that the 16-year delay and the existence of a civil suit rendered the case a "civil dispute in criminal color," the Court found that the allegations went beyond a simple title dispute to encompass specific acts of fraud and misrepresentation.

The Court reasoned that evaluating the "voluntariness" of the Hibanama or whether it was obtained through coercion is an intrinsically factual exercise requiring evidence.

Since the trial court had already considered the material and framed charges, the High Court determined that interference would prematurely stifle a legitimate prosecution.

The Court held that the availability of civil remedies does not preclude criminal action where the ingredients of a crime are prima facie made out.

No order as to costs was made.