### Pendency of Civil Suit Is No Bar to Section 133 CrPC Proceedings for Removal of Public Nuisance

Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint under Section 133 of the Cr.P.C. before the District Magistrate, Dehradun, alleging that Applicant No. 1 (now represented by legal heirs) had blocked a 15-foot public path by installing a gate and parking vehicles, thereby creating a public nuisance.

A revenue team inspection confirmed the encroachment on a pathway shown in the sale deeds of both parties.

On 11.01.2019, the City Magistrate ordered the removal of the gate.

The Applicants challenged this in the Sessions Court via a revision petition, arguing that the dispute was civil in nature (citing a pending suit, O.S. No. 47 of 2018) and that the path was a "dead end" used only by a few residents.

The Revision was dismissed on 30.01.2021.

The Applicants then moved the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

1. Whether the pendency of a civil suit regarding the same property bars proceedings under Section 133 of the Cr.P.C. for the removal of a public nuisance.

2. Whether a pathway in a private colony that terminates in a "dead end" qualifies as a "public place" for the purpose of invoking Section 133 Cr.P.C.

The Court applied Section 133 of the Cr.P.C., which empowers an Executive Magistrate to order the removal of obstructions from public places.

It relied on Hari Ram v. Jyoti Prasad (2011), establishing that roads left for public use in private colonies are public property and encroachments thereon constitute a "public wrong".

Per Budhwa v. State of U.P. (2006) and Smt. Ramawati v. State of U.P. (2015), the court held that the pendency of a civil suit does not preclude the Magistrate from acting to remove a nuisance immediately.

Regarding jurisdiction, the court cited Dulichand v. State of Delhi (1975), noting that revisional courts cannot re-appreciate evidence or sit as an appellate authority.

The Court observed that the sale deeds of both the Applicants and the Respondents explicitly demarcated a 15-foot pathway.

It rejected the argument that a "dead end" path is private, noting that according to Supreme Court precedent, paths left for public utility in plating/colonies remain public for all residents; thus, obstructing any part of it is a public nuisance.

The Court found that the civil suit (O.S. 47/2018) was filed after the Section 133 proceedings began and concerned a different specific encroachment, thereby not acting as a bar.

Since the lower courts had based their findings on a factual report by the revenue team and the admission that a gate was installed, the High Court found no jurisdictional error or perversity that justified interference under its Section 482 powers.

The High Court affirmed that blocking a public path with a gate constitutes a public nuisance regardless of the number of people affected.

The Criminal Misc. Application under Section 482 was dismissed, and the orders of the City Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge were upheld.