Pendency of Criminal Cases Involving Trivial Offences Does Not Warrant Absolute Cancellation of Candidature for Appointment

The petitioner applied for the post of Constable (Civil Police) under the 2023 advertisement. He qualified the written exam and document verification.

During the medical examination on 23.04.2025, he truthfully disclosed three pending criminal cases in an affidavit: Case Crime No. 364/2021 (IPC 352, 504), Case Crime No. 13/2022 (IPC 323, 504, 506 and SC/ST Act), and Case Crime No. 711/2023 (IPC 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471).

On 03.09.2025, Respondent No. 6 cancelled his candidature on the grounds that the third case involved "moral turpitude" and was pending trial.

However, the High Court had already quashed the FIR for the third case on 01.02.2024, noting the dispute was commercial and settled.

1. Whether the cancellation of the petitioner's candidature was legally sustainable when the primary case cited as involving "moral turpitude" had already been quashed by a Division Bench.

2. Whether the pendency of the remaining two criminal cases, involving general allegations and sentences up to seven years, rendered the petitioner unfit for appointment.

The court primarily applied the guidelines from Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 471, which establishes that while an employer has the right to consider antecedents, they must act objectively, considering the triviality of offences and whether facts were suppressed.

It further relied on State Bank of India v. P. Soupramaniane (2019) 18 SCC 135, which held that simple assault or bodily injury does not automatically constitute "moral turpitude".

The court also invoked the principle from Commissioner of Police v. Sandeep Kumar, emphasizing a reformative rather than punitive approach toward youthful indiscretions.

The court found that the impugned order was factually flawed because it treated FIR No. 711/2023 as pending, whereas it had been quashed by the High Court over a year prior to the cancellation order.

The respondents failed to address this quashing in their counter-affidavit.

Regarding the remaining two cases, the court noted that the petitioner had not suppressed any information and that the allegations were general in nature, punishable by less than seven years, and did not prima facie involve moral turpitude affecting society at large.

The court underscored that the petitioner is not a convict, and the mere pendency of these two cases—balancing the reformative principles in Avtar Singh—was insufficient to deny him employment.

The Court directed Respondent No. 6 to issue an appointment letter to the petitioner forthwith, specifying that the appointment shall remain subject to the final outcome of the two pending criminal trials.