Pending review petition constitutes sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning appeal delay.

The present applicant (original respondent No. 3) sought to recall a court order dated 11.06.2026, which had condoned a four-day delay in filing a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA).

The applicant contended that the actual delay was nearly 10 years.

The procedural history shows that the appellant’s Special Civil Application was rejected on 29.04.2016. The appellant filed a review petition in 2019 (after a 1166-day delay), which was condoned by a Single Judge on 17.06.2025. The review was ultimately dismissed on merits on 09.09.2025, leading to the filing of the LPA on 12.11.2025.

The applicant argued that the period spent pursuing the review petition should not be considered "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay in the appeal.

1. Whether the period spent bona fide prosecuting a review petition before a competent Single Judge constitutes "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning delay in filing a subsequent appeal.

2. Whether the principles of Section 14 of the Limitation Act apply to a situation where the initial forum (the Single Judge in review) possessed the requisite jurisdiction.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, regarding the extension of the prescribed period of limitation upon showing "sufficient cause".

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the exclusion of time taken in proceedings bona fide in a court without jurisdiction.

Deena (Dead) Through LRs. v. Bharat Singh (Dead) [(2002) 6 SCC 336] and Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department [(2008) 7 SCC 169], regarding the application of Section 14 principles to Section 5.

The court rejected the applicant's contention that the limitation should be computed strictly from the 2016 dismissal.

It reasoned that a litigant cannot simultaneously pursue an appeal and a review as they are parallel remedies, and filing a review is a valid legal option.

The court held that because the Single Judge chose to entertain the review and kept it pending for nearly nine years, this duration must "inure to the benefit of the appellant" regarding the delay in filing the appeal.

Regarding Section 14, the court clarified it was inapplicable because the Single Judge did have jurisdiction to hear the review.

Under Section 5, the court found "sufficient cause" existed because the appellant only became entitled to challenge the original order in the LPA once the review petition was finally dismissed.

The court held that there was no error in its previous order dated 11.06.2026 and refused to recall it. The application for recall was dismissed.