Pending Supreme Court adjudication, tribunals cannot dismiss motor accident claims solely as limitation-barred.

On 16 May 2022, the petitioner’s ten-year-old daughter, Laddo Tulavi, was present in the courtyard of their house when a water tanker allegedly being driven rashly and negligently entered the premises after breaking the boundary wall and fatally struck her.

She died at the spot. A criminal case was registered and a charge-sheet was filed on 15 December 2022.

The petitioner subsequently filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, approximately three years after the accident.

He sought condonation of delay, explaining that he was a poor rural agriculturist from a remote tribal area, had suffered severe mental trauma following his daughter’s death, and lacked legal awareness.

The Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal dismissed the claim petition at the threshold on 17 June 2025 as barred by limitation.

The petitioner challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the Claims Tribunal was justified in dismissing the petitioner’s claim petition solely on the ground of limitation without properly considering the explanation for delay?

2. Whether, during the pendency of the constitutional challenge to Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claim petition could be dismissed as time-barred in view of the Supreme Court’s interim directions?

Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, inserted with effect from 1 April 2022, provides that an application for compensation shall not be entertained unless made within six months of the accident.

The Court also considered Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, concerning condonation of delay, and the beneficial and remedial purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act.

It relied upon the Supreme Court’s interim order dated 4 November 2025 in SLP (C) No. 8412 of 2023, which directed that, during the pendency of the proceedings, Tribunals and High Courts should not dismiss claim petitions as barred by limitation under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

The Court further applied the principle that a motor accident compensation claim, particularly one arising from the death of a child, should not be rejected at the threshold on a hyper-technical basis without proper consideration of the claimant’s explanation.

The High Court held that the Tribunal had adopted a hyper-technical approach by rejecting the claim without adequately considering the petitioner’s pleaded circumstances—namely, the death of his minor daughter, resulting mental trauma, poverty, rural and tribal background, and lack of legal awareness.

The Court noted that it was not deciding the merits of the compensation claim, but only whether the delay deserved proper consideration.

Since the validity and operation of the limitation provision under Section 166(3) were pending before the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court had expressly directed that claims should not be dismissed on that ground during the pendency of the proceedings, dismissal of the petitioner’s claim was considered unsustainable.

The petitioner was therefore entitled to have his claim considered on merits by the Tribunal.

The Claims Tribunal was directed to decide the petitioner’s claim application on its own merits, keeping in view the Supreme Court’s observations and interim directions in SLP (C) No. 8412 of 2023.

The parties were directed to appear before the concerned Tribunal on 15 October 2026.