Personal Injury Claims For Custodial Torture Abate Upon Victim's Death Under Rule of *Actio Personalis*

The original petitioner, Gurmeet Singh, filed this writ petition in 2014 alleging "third-degree torture" and custodial violence by police officials (Respondents 7 and 9) following his remand.

He sought exemplary compensation, departmental inquiries, and the initiation of contempt proceedings based on the guidelines in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal.

During the pendency of the writ, Respondent No. 7 was convicted by a trial court for offenses under Sections 326/331/34 of the IPC.

Gurmeet Singh died on 20.11.2018, and his wife was subsequently substituted as the petitioner in 2022 via I.A.(C)No.508/2022.

Respondent No. 7 challenged the maintainability of the petition, arguing that the cause of action was personal to the deceased.

The court applied the common law maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona (a personal right of action dies with the person), noting its statutory modifications under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the Legal Representatives Suits Act, 1855, and Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

It relied heavily on the precedent Kumud Lall v. Suresh Chandra Roy (Dead) through LRs & Ors. (2026 INSC 443), which distinguishes between "proprietary rights" (affecting the estate) and "personal rights" (affecting status/well-being), holding that personal injury claims abate upon death unless a decree was obtained during the lifetime of the plaintiff.

The court reasoned that the alleged torture was a "personal wrong" and a violation of Article 21 rights specific to Late Gurmeet Singh.

There was no evidence or material on record to suggest that the death of the petitioner was caused by the alleged torture, which would have potentially brought the case under the Fatal Accidents Act.

Applying the Kumud Lall framework, the court found that since no decree or final order for compensation had been passed prior to Singh’s death, the right to sue did not survive to his legal heirs.

The court distinguished "proprietary rights" (which relate to the deceased’s estate and survive) from "personal rights" (relating to pain, suffering, and bodily injury), concluding that the latter are not transferable to legal representatives.

Consequently, the substitution of the wife did not entitle her to pursue reliefs that were personal to her late husband.

The court granted liberty to the widow to independently challenge the orders of the Assam Human Rights Commission (which had dropped her complaint) or to approach the Police Accountability Commission, noting that such actions would be based on her independent standing rather than as a substituted party in the original writ; the dismissal of this petition does not operate as res judicata for such future actions.