Petitions seeking fresh FIRs and an independent probe into 2020 Delhi riots dismissed; court finds no exceptional grounds for intervention

The petitions arose from the communal violence in North-East Delhi in February 2020, following protests and counter-mobilisations related to the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 and the proposed National Register of Citizens.

Seven petitions sought, among other reliefs, registration of criminal cases against persons alleged to have made inflammatory speeches, transfer of investigations or constitution of an SIT, preservation of electronic evidence, and compensation and rehabilitation for victims.

At the hearing, the petitioners confined their submissions to those surviving prayers.

By February 2026, 757 criminal cases had been registered; investigations, prosecutions and trials had substantially progressed, and a Claims Commissioner had been appointed to assess riot-related damage and compensation claims.

One petitioner had pursued a complaint through the Magistrate and this Court, with the matter ultimately considered by the Supreme Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India & Ors.

1. Whether the Court should direct registration of criminal cases against individuals alleged to have delivered inflammatory speeches, notwithstanding the statutory remedies and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay.

2. Whether the allegations and material concerning police inaction, complicity or misconduct justified transferring the riot investigations to an independent agency, constituting an SIT, or ordering a general inquiry.

3. Whether a general direction was warranted for preservation of CCTV footage and other electronic evidence, given the stage of the investigations and proceedings.

4. Whether further general directions for compensation and rehabilitation of riot victims were required, given the existing claims mechanism.

Article 226 confers wide but discretionary constitutional jurisdiction, to be exercised cautiously and not ordinarily as a substitute for statutory criminal procedures.

Under Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, registration of an FIR is mandatory where information discloses a cognizable offence; Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh recognises recourse through Sections 154(3), 156(3) and 200 of the CrPC for grievances about non-registration or investigation.

Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay held that constitutional courts cannot create or expand criminal offences, that the existing law addresses hate speech, and that the CrPC provides an effective procedural framework; extraordinary constitutional relief should not routinely bypass it.

Transfer of investigation to an independent agency is reserved for rare and exceptional cases where material shows the investigation is tainted, compromised or incapable of inspiring confidence (Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights; Rubabbuddin Sheikh; K.V. Rajendran).

Public-interest proceedings should not ordinarily be used to supervise criminal investigations or trials.

Compensation under Articles 32 and 226 may be awarded for an established infringement of fundamental rights, but public-law compensation is distinct from private-law damages (Rudul Sah; Nilabati Behera).

The Court held that no further FIR direction was justified: statutory remedies had not generally been pursued, the speech material was disputed and incomplete, and Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay had addressed the relevant legal framework without directing FIR registration or continuing judicial supervision.

As to investigation, the materials—including the Delhi Minorities Commission report, videos, affidavits and victim accounts—did not establish a systemic or institutional compromise of the investigations.

The alleged misconduct by police personnel was not sufficiently connected to the conduct of the subsequent investigations, and the criminal process had substantially progressed.

On electronic evidence, no specific instance of destruction, tampering or deliberate withholding was identified; issues concerning evidence in individual prosecutions could be raised before the competent criminal courts.

On compensation and rehabilitation, the existing claims mechanism had processed claims and awarded compensation, and the petitioners had not demonstrated systemic failure requiring further general directions.

The dismissal did not preclude individuals or competent authorities from pursuing remedies available under law in particular cases.

The writ petitions and pending applications were dismissed, with no order as to costs.