Plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 when limitation is a mixed question of law and fact.

The plaintiff-bank filed O.S. No. 1295 of 2020 for recovery of Rs. 5,31,486/- against the 2nd defendant (borrower) and 3rd defendant (guarantor).

The 2nd defendant had availed a loan in 2010 and superannuated on November 30, 2012.

However, his terminal benefits were withheld by the 1st defendant (employer) due to disciplinary proceedings, which concluded only on March 5, 2018.

The 2nd defendant filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC (I.A. No. 5 of 2022) seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit, filed in 2020 for a 2010 loan, was barred by limitation.

The Trial Court dismissed the application, holding that limitation was a mixed question of law and fact.

The 2nd defendant challenged this via the present Revision Petition.

1. Whether the revision petitioner made out a case for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC on the grounds of limitation.

The Court applied Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which mandates the rejection of a plaint where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.

It relied on the established principle that while deciding such an application, the Court must look only at the plaint and accompanying documents, not the defense.

Furthermore, the Court invoked the judicial principle that while "pure questions of law" regarding limitation can be decided at the threshold, issues where limitation is a "mixed question of law and fact" require evidence and must be determined through trial.

The Court noted precedents including *Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh* and *Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali* regarding the standards for rejection of a plaint.

The Court noted that the plaintiff’s case rested on the specific contractual term that the loan would be settled from the 2nd defendant's terminal benefits upon superannuation.

Because these benefits were legally withheld due to departmental proceedings until March 5, 2018, the plaintiff argued the cause of action was deferred and the 2020 filing was timely.

The Court reasoned that determining the exact starting point of the limitation period required an inquiry into when the right to sue accrued in light of the concluded disciplinary proceedings.

Since the determination of whether the suit was barred depended on these specific facts and the interpretation of the employment-related stay on benefits, it constituted a mixed question of law and fact that could not be decided summarily under Order VII Rule 11.

The Court held that since the issue of limitation in this specific context required evidence to unearth the truth regarding the accrual of the cause of action, a trial was absolutely necessary.

The petitioner failed to demonstrate that the plaint, on its face, was barred by law.

No costs were awarded; connected petitions were closed.