Plaintiff as dominus litis may implead pendente lite transferees to prevent multiplicity of proceedings in specific performance suits.

The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit (RCS-A No. 84/2022) against the petitioner for the specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 04.03.2020.

During the pendency of the suit, and after a temporary injunction was refused, the petitioner sold portions of the suit property to third parties.

The trial court, via an order dated 27.02.2026, allowed the plaintiff’s applications under Order 6 Rule 17 and Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC to implead these subsequent purchasers and challenge their sale deeds.

The petitioner challenged this order before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, arguing that subsequent purchasers are not necessary parties until rights are crystallized.

1. Whether subsequent purchasers (transferees pendente lite) are necessary or proper parties to be impleaded in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell.

2. Whether the trial court’s exercise of discretionary power to allow impleadment and amendment warranted interference under supervisory jurisdiction.

The court applied Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC regarding the addition of parties and Order 6 Rule 17 for amendments.

The court relied on the principle that the plaintiff is dominus litis.

Following H. Anjanappa v. A. Prabhakar (2025), the court noted that impleadment of a transferee pendente lite is a discretionary power based on the facts of the case, and such parties can be joined to protect their interests or avoid improper conduct of the suit.

In Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind (2024), the court noted it has the discretion to enable purchasers with legally enforceable rights to protect their interests.

In Robin Ramjibhai Patel v. Anandibai Rama (2018), the court addressed the special status of the plaintiff.

In Savitri Devi v. District Judge, Gorakhpur (1999), it was held that avoiding multiplicity of proceedings is a primary object of Order 1 Rule 10.

The High Court examined the timeline of the property alienation, noting it occurred while the specific performance suit was active.

The court rejected the petitioner's argument that impleadment was premature, reasoning that under the established precedents of the Supreme Court, a court has the discretion to join subsequent transferees to effectively adjudicate all questions in the suit and prevent future litigation.

The court highlighted that because the plaintiff is the "master of the suit" (dominus litis), their request to include parties whose interests are directly affected by the outcome should generally be respected to ensure justice.

Consequently, the joinder of the buyers and the challenge to their sale deeds were deemed necessary to resolve the dispute "effectively and completely".

It held that the trial court properly exercised its discretionary power under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC to allow the impleadment of subsequent purchasers and the amendment of the plaint.

The petition was dismissed as devoid of merit, and no case for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution was made out.