POCSO FIR quashed to prevent re-victimisation where de-juré victim disclaims injury and leads stable matrimonial life.

The petitioner (aged 22) and respondent No. 2 (the prosecutrix, aged 17) entered into a relationship and married according to Sikh rites on 04.09.2024

A male child was born on 12.06.2025

The subject FIR (No. 279/2025) was registered on 13.06.2025 under Section 64(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 6 of the POCSO Act at the instance of hospital doctors who discovered the prosecutrix was a minor during delivery, in compliance with Section 21 of the POCSO Act

The prosecutrix filed an affidavit and stated before the court that she married of her own volition, resides happily in her matrimonial home, and that prosecuting the petitioner would destroy her family and leave her and her infant without support

1. Whether an "offence" can be said to exist if no loss or injury has been claimed to have been suffered by a "victim" as statutorily defined under the Cr.P.C. or BNSS.

2. Whether a penal provision should be applied pedantically when it results in the grave re-victimization of the de-jure victim.

3. Whether the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 528 of the BNSS, can quash POCSO proceedings based on the subsequent marriage and welfare of the parties.

The court primarily considered the definition of a "victim" under Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. and Section 2(1)(y) of the BNSS, which requires a person to have suffered "loss or injury"

It relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, which established the substantive and participatory rights of a victim in criminal proceedings

The court further applied the principles from Ayyub Malik v. State of Uttarakhand and K. Kirubakaran v. State of T.N., which held that subsequent marriage and the welfare of the parties can outweigh the need to conclude criminal proceedings in consensual adolescent relationships

Finally, it followed the guidelines for quashing heinous offences established in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, balancing the "ends of justice" against the "abuse of process"

The court identified a "conceptual dissonance" between the rigid legal construct of the POCSO Act and the lived reality of the parties

It distinguished between a "de-jure victim" (a minor who cannot legally consent) and a "de-facto victim" (one who has actually suffered harm)

Reasoning through the lens of social philosopher Joel Feinberg, the court noted that in consensual adolescent relationships, there may be a "wrong" (violation of a legal right) without a "harm" (setback to interests)

The court observed that while the POCSO Act treats minor consent as irrelevant, prosecuting a husband/father in a stable family unit based on a technicality results in "re-victimization"

It critiqued the "retributive line of action" by the State when the alleged victim disclaims any injury

The court formulated a set of "guardrails" for quashing such cases, including: the free will of the prosecutrix, the absence of violence, the age gap, family stability, and the best interests of the child

It concluded that continuing the trial would be an "exercise in futility" and an "abuse of process" since the family's destruction would be the only outcome

The court held that where there is no de-facto victim and the parties have settled into a stable family life, continuation of the case constitutes harassment

Consequently, the High Court allowed the petition and quashed FIR No. 279/2025 and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom