POCSO presumptions cannot arise until the prosecution establishes foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt.

The appellant was prosecuted in connection with Shahkund P.S. Case No. 78 of 2021 for allegedly committing rape and penetrative sexual assault upon the victim, stated to be a child, on 17 February 2021. According to the prosecution, the appellant took the victim to an isolated place at about 7:00 p.m., threatened her with a “sixer,” and raped her. It was further alleged that, on 5 March 2021, the appellant eve-teased her, following which she disclosed the earlier incident to her mother. The written information was submitted on 7 March 2021, and the appellant was charged under Section 376 IPC and Sections 4, 8 and 18 of the POCSO Act.

The prosecution examined seven witnesses, including the victim, her mother, the investigating officer and the medical officer. The defence examined three witnesses to support its case of false implication arising from a dispute between the parties.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 376 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act and sentenced him to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹10,000. The appellant challenged the conviction and sentence in the present appeal.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed rape and penetrative sexual assault upon the victim, thereby attracting Section 376 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act?

Whether the victim’s age was sufficiently established to invoke the provisions and statutory presumptions under the POCSO Act?

Whether the contradictions regarding the place of occurrence, delay in lodging the FIR, absence of medical evidence and the defence evidence rendered the conviction unsafe?

The Court applied Section 376 IPC concerning rape and Sections 4, 8 and 18 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, particularly the requirement that the victim must be proved to be a “child” and that the prosecution must establish the foundational facts before the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act can operate.

Section 162 CrPC was applied to hold that a statement made to the police during investigation cannot ordinarily be signed by the maker or used as substantive evidence, subject to the statutory exceptions.

The Court relied on the principle that medical/radiological age estimation carries an applicable margin of error and referred to Court on its Own Motion v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4484, Manu Kumar @ Monu Kumar @ Mannu Kumar v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 200 of 2023, decided on 10 February 2026, and Rajak Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 9 SCC 248.

The Court further reiterated that the presumption of innocence continues to operate in POCSO cases and that conviction must be based on reliable and legally admissible evidence.

The Court found material inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence concerning the place of occurrence: the mother stated that the offence occurred in a vacant room, the victim stated that it occurred in a field, and the investigating officer identified another vacant room as the place of occurrence.

The victim’s delayed disclosure, the two-day delay in lodging the FIR after the alleged second incident, and the absence of any recovery of the alleged weapon were considered relevant circumstances affecting the prosecution case.

The medical examination found no physical or chemical injury and no evidence of recent sexual intercourse.

The Court also held that the radiological age range of 14–16 years, when assessed with a two-year margin of error, could extend to 18 years; consequently, the victim’s status as a child for POCSO purposes was not satisfactorily established.

Since the foundational facts were not proved, the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act could not be invoked.

Considering these deficiencies, the inconsistent testimony, the defence evidence regarding the appellant’s age and alleged prior dispute with the victim’s family, and the absence of sufficiently reliable corroboration, the Court concluded that the conviction was unsafe.

The Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the victim’s status as a child and the foundational facts necessary for the POCSO presumptions, and had also failed to prove the charge under Section 376 IPC through wholly reliable evidence.

As the appellant was in custody, the Court directed that he be released forthwith unless required in any other case.