POCSO prosecutions cannot ordinarily be quashed under inherent powers solely on the basis of compromise.

The petitioner sought quashing under Section 528 of the BNSS of FIR Crime No. 125/2026 registered at Police Station City Kotwali, District Bhind, for offences under Sections 137(2), 87 and 64(2)(m) of the BNS and Sections 5L/6 of the POCSO Act, along with consequential proceedings in Sessions Case No. 16/2026.

The prosecution alleged that the complainant’s approximately sixteen-year-old daughter left home on 12 March 2026 to purchase samosas and did not return.

After unsuccessful searches, the complainant suspected that an unknown person had enticed or induced her and taken her away.

During the proceedings, the petitioner and the complainant/respondent No. 2 filed compromise applications supported by affidavits.

The Principal Registrar verified the parties, their signatures and the voluntary nature of the compromise.

The petitioner had not married the prosecutrix.

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings on the basis of a compromise between the accused and the complainant in a case involving offences under the POCSO Act?

Whether the compromise could be accepted on the basis of precedents permitting quashing in exceptional circumstances involving a subsequent marriage and harmonious matrimonial life?

The Court applied Section 528 of the BNSS, under which the High Court’s inherent powers must be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process.

Relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Court reiterated that heinous or serious offences having a social impact ordinarily cannot be quashed merely because the parties have compromised.

The Court further relied on the POCSO Act’s protective and societal purpose, holding that offences against children are not merely private disputes and that a compromise cannot override the statutory mandate or public interest.

The Court distinguished Mahesh Mukund Patel v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 614, and Ajay Mohan v. State of U.P., 2026 AHC 103624, where relief was granted in circumstances involving marriage and a subsequent happy matrimonial life.

Although the compromise was verified as voluntary and free from coercion, the alleged offences included offences under the POCSO Act involving a minor victim.

Applying the principles governing inherent jurisdiction, the Court held that the nature of the offences and their broader social impact outweighed the parties’ private settlement.

The precedents relied upon by the petitioner did not assist him because they concerned materially different facts, particularly a subsequent marriage between the accused and the prosecutrix and an established happy married life; no such marriage had occurred in the present case.

Quashing the prosecution solely on the basis of compromise would undermine the protective object of the POCSO Act and be contrary to the governing law.

It held that a compromise, even if voluntarily verified, was insufficient to quash proceedings involving offences under the POCSO Act, particularly where the victim was a minor.

The petition seeking quashing of FIR Crime No. 125/2026 and Sessions Case No. 16/2026 was accordingly dismissed, and all pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.