POCSO’s statutory presumption arises only after prosecution proves foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt.

The appellant was prosecuted for allegedly taking the minor victim, aged approximately 14–15 years, to the CIRA Industries office on 27 June 2021 and committing penetrative sexual assault upon her, while also threatening to circulate a video of the incident.

The trial court convicted him under Sections 376(3) and 506 of the IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act, sentencing him to twenty years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act and seven years’ rigorous imprisonment under the second part of Section 506 IPC.

The prosecution examined the victim, her father, the examining doctor, and the investigating officer.

The defence relied, inter alia, on evidence of monetary transactions and an alleged loan dispute between the victim’s father and the appellant.

1. Whether the prosecution proved the alleged penetrative sexual assault and criminal intimidation against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt?

2. Whether the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act could be invoked without the prosecution first establishing the foundational facts of the alleged offence?

3. Whether the victim’s testimony was sufficiently consistent and reliable to sustain the conviction without substantial corroboration?

4. Whether the defence had rebutted the prosecution case by establishing a probable alternative version and creating reasonable doubt?

The Court considered Sections 376(3) and 506 of the IPC and Sections 4, 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act.

Section 29 POCSO permits a presumption that the accused committed the charged offence only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of the alleged offence; the presumption is not automatic or conclusive.

Relying on Veerpal v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2686, and Joy v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 783, the Court held that foundational facts must first be proved beyond reasonable doubt, after which the accused may rebut the presumption on a preponderance of probabilities.

The Court further relied on Ramanand v. State of U.P., AIR 2022 SC 5273, for the principles that the presumption of innocence remains applicable and that the accused may establish a probable defence without proving it beyond reasonable doubt.

Under Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21, a “sterling witness” must give a consistent, natural, and unassailable account capable of withstanding cross-examination and cohering with the other evidence.

The Court found material inconsistencies and gaps in the prosecution case.

The victim’s assertion that she was forcibly taken to the alleged place of occurrence while going to coaching was not stated to the investigating officer, and the Court noted that the relevant coaching activities appeared to have been prohibited during the COVID-19 lockdown period.

The investigation did not verify the coaching centre, examine the guard or staff of CIRA Industries, establish that the appellant worked there, identify the particular room of occurrence, or recover any alleged video footage.

The medical examination disclosed no external or internal injury, and the Court treated the medical evidence as not corroborating penetrative sexual assault.

The victim’s additional allegations of earlier sexual assaults were not contemporaneously disclosed to her parents and were unsupported by independent evidence.

The Court also considered the admitted monetary relationship between the families and the defence evidence concerning an alleged unpaid loan, concluding that the defence had presented a plausible motive for false implication.

In these circumstances, the prosecution failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to activate Section 29 POCSO.

Even assuming that the presumption arose, the inconsistencies, investigative omissions, medical evidence, and defence version created a reasonable doubt and demonstrated that the victim did not satisfy the standard of a “sterling witness”.

The trial court had erred in relying on the statutory presumption and in appreciating the evidence.

The conviction judgment dated 31 July 2023 and order of sentence dated 2 August 2023 were set aside.

The appellant was acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt and directed to be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.

The appeal was accordingly allowed.