Police officers convicted under NDPS Act can be dismissed without departmental inquiry even if sentence is suspended: Himachal Pradesh High Court.

Both petitioners were serving Constables in the Himachal Pradesh Police. Petitioner Gaurav Verma (appointed 2009) was booked in FIR No. 59/2016 dated 25.02.2016 (P.S. Balh) under Section 20 of the NDPS Act for recovery of 1003 grams of charas; he was convicted by the Special Judge, Mandi, sentenced to three years' imprisonment with a fine of ₹25,000, and his sentence (but not conviction) was stayed by the High Court in his pending criminal appeal.

Petitioner Lakshay Chauhan (appointed 2015, sports quota) was booked in FIR No. 84/2019 under Sections 21, 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act and Section 192 of the MV Act (P.S. Bhuntar, Kullu) and was convicted by the Special Judge-II, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushahr vide judgment dated 26.12.2023; his sentence stood suspended in appeal.

By orders dated 12.01.2026 and 13.01.2026 respectively, the Director General of Police (DGP) dismissed both petitioners from service without inquiry, invoking Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution and Section 63 of the HP Police Act, 2007, on the ground of conduct leading to their conviction on criminal charges.

The petitioners challenged the orders contending that the DGP was not the disciplinary/appointing authority, that the safeguards in Tulsiram Patel and the DOPT OM dated 25.11.2022 were ignored, and that dismissal was impermissible since their sentences stood suspended.

Article 311(2) of the Constitution, read with clause (a) of its second proviso, which dispenses with the requirement of a departmental inquiry where a government servant is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge.

Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, which holds that conviction does not automatically entail dismissal—the disciplinary authority must itself (though ex parte) peruse the criminal court's judgment, weigh all facts and circumstances, decide whether a penalty is warranted and which of the three penalties is appropriate, and ensure the penalty is not arbitrary, grossly excessive or disproportionate.

Rule 16.1(2) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (as applicable to H.P.), under which the punishment of dismissal may be inflicted on Constables by a Superintendent of Police "or by any officer of higher rank".

Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Mukesh Poonamchand Shah (Civil Appeal No. 1804 of 2020), along with Dy. Director of Collegiate Education v. S. Nagoor Meera and K.C. Sareen v. CBI, holding that pendency of an appeal or suspension of sentence/bail is no bar to action under clause (a), since the conviction subsists until set aside.

On the competency issue, the Court reasoned that under Rule 16.1(2) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, dismissal of a Constable may be imposed by the Superintendent of Police "or by any officer of higher rank"; since the DGP is manifestly an officer of higher rank than those enumerated in the table, he was competent to impose dismissal, rendering the non est challenge meritless.

On the substantive issue, the Court examined the impugned orders and found that the DGP had recorded his awareness of the convictions and had expressly examined the judgments of conviction, the nature and gravity of the offences proved, and the quantity and character of the contraband before imposing dismissal—thereby satisfying the Tulsiram Patel mandate.

The Court emphasized that the safeguards against disproportionate punishment must be applied to the factual matrix of each case; here, the convicts were police constables—the "protectors of law" themselves becoming violators—convicted under the NDPS Act, an offence of severe gravity especially for members of a disciplined force tasked with checking drug offences.

Applying LIC v. Mukesh Poonamchand Shah, the Court held that suspension of sentence in appeal did not stay the conviction, and pendency of the criminal appeals constituted no embargo on invoking clause (a) of the second proviso.

The Court dismissed both writ petitions as devoid of merit, finding no infirmity or illegality in the impugned orders dated 12.01.2026 and 13.01.2026, as the DGP had duly considered the convictions and gravity of the offences.