Portal-only GST order did not trigger appeal deadline for inactive taxpayer, Tripura High Court rules

The petitioner challenged the rejection of his appeal against a State Tax order, on the ground that the appeal was delayed.

The tax order was uploaded to the GST common portal but, according to the petitioner, was not served by any other mode under Section 169 of the Tripura State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“TSGST Act”).

He stated that he learned of the order when applying for a tax-clearance certificate in the first week of February 2024 and filed his appeal on 12 March 2024.

The appellate authority refused to condone the delay, reasoning that it exceeded the period it could condone under Section 107(4).

Whether uploading the tax order to the GST common portal, without service by another mode under Section 169 of the TSGST Act, constituted communication of the order so as to start the limitation period for appeal

Whether the petitioner’s lack of knowledge of the order until February 2024 constituted sufficient cause to condone the delay, or meant that the appeal was within time when calculated from the date of knowledge

Section 169(1) of the TSGST Act provides alternative modes for serving notices, orders and other documents, including making them available on the common portal; the authority must exercise its choice of service reasonably and fairly in the circumstances.

Section 107 prescribes the time for filing an appeal and permits only a limited extension for delay.

The Court followed *Sharp Tanks and Structurals Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner (GST) (Appeals)*, which held that although portal service is a mode authorised by Section 169, the authority may be required, on the facts of a particular case, to use another available mode as well; the Court also referred to decisions including *Abitha Timber Traders v. Commissioner* and *Leto v. STO*.

It distinguished *M/s Bambino Agro Industries Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, noting that it recognised portal service as permissible but held that Section 169(2)’s deeming fiction did not apply to service under Section 169(1)(d).

The Court accepted the reasoning in *Sharp Tanks* that the existence of portal service under Section 169 does not dispense with the authority’s obligation to exercise its choice of service reasonably.

The respondents’ own position was that the petitioner had not been producing or manufacturing goods since 29 April 2016.

In those circumstances, the Court held that the authorities should also have communicated the order by another available mode, such as email or registered or speed post.

Portal uploading alone did not give the petitioner constructive notice or start limitation on the date of the order; the limitation period was therefore to be reckoned from when he learned of it.

It set aside the appellate authority’s order, restored the appeal, condoned the delay and directed the authority to decide the appeal on its merits, in accordance with natural justice, within three months.

The resulting order was to be communicated by a mode other than portal uploading.