POSH appellate authorities must assess prejudice and the full record before setting aside committee findings.

Respondent Rakesh Gupta and respondent no. 2 were employees of Axis Bank.

After respondent no. 2 complained of incidents of sexual harassment on 2 and 20 November 2021, the Bank’s Internal Committee (IC) conducted an inquiry, found against Gupta and recommended disciplinary action; the Bank dismissed him on 23 February 2022.

Gupta appealed under Section 18 of the POSH Act.

On 7 August 2023, the Industrial Tribunal allowed his appeal, set aside the IC’s findings and recommendations, and quashed the consequential action.

The Bank and the complainant challenged that order before the High Court, contending, among other things, that the Tribunal had not properly assessed the inquiry record or the alleged denial of cross-examination.

1. Whether the Tribunal, exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 18 of the POSH Act, adequately examined the IC’s findings and the material on record.

2. Whether the Tribunal could set aside the IC’s findings based on an alleged denial of cross-examination without assessing whether the procedure caused prejudice to Gupta.

3. Whether the High Court should substitute its own assessment of the inquiry record or remit the matter to the statutory appellate authority.

Section 18 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 provides an appeal against specified recommendations or their non-implementation; the appellate forum must examine the correctness of the IC’s report and findings.

Under Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 164, a Section 18 appellate forum must adjudicate the challenge to the IC report and recommendations in accordance with law.

Under State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, a procedural violation ordinarily does not automatically invalidate proceedings: unless there is a fundamental denial of notice or hearing, the decision-maker must consider whether the violation caused prejudice and deprived the affected person of a fair opportunity.

Ajay Tiwari v. University of Delhi, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4390, and S. Janaki Iyer v. Union of India, (2025) 8 SCC 696, similarly apply the test of prejudice or fair hearing to alleged breaches of natural justice.

The Tribunal’s decision was substantially based on its conclusion that Gupta had been denied cross-examination, but it did not determine whether he had otherwise received a fair and effective opportunity to meet the case or whether any procedural deficiency caused prejudice.

Nor did it assess the IC’s findings against the record as a whole, including witness statements, electronic and audio material, correspondence, and the parties’ explanations.

The Tribunal also proceeded on the factual premise that no complaint followed the first incident, although the record indicated that the complainant emailed an Assistant Vice-President on 10 November 2021 about the 2 November incident, and the matter was forwarded to HR.

Because these matters required the statutory appellate authority’s assessment in the first instance, the High Court declined to undertake its own merits review.

It expressed no view on the merits and directed the Tribunal to endeavour to decide the matter preferably within six months.

Gupta was permitted to raise before the Tribunal his claim for arrears, last-drawn wages, and consequential monetary benefits.

The petitions and pending applications were disposed of.