Possession of an additional qualification confers no preferential claim absent prescribed comparative merit criteria.

The University of Delhi issued an advertisement dated 20.09.2021 for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor, followed by an addendum dated 07.10.2021.

By corrigendum dated 01.11.2021, issued pursuant to a UGC communication, the University clarified that a Ph.D. would not be a mandatory qualification and revised the shortlisting criteria.

The Appellant applied for the post in the Department of Library and Information Science, was shortlisted, and participated in the presentation and interview.

The Selection Committee selected Respondent No. 5 for appointment on 28.03.2023.

The Appellant contended that he possessed a Ph.D. and had secured 80 out of 100 marks, whereas Respondent No. 5 obtained a Ph.D. only in 2023.

He challenged the corrigendum and Respondent No. 5’s selection through a writ petition.

The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, holding that the corrigendum had been issued before the last date for applications, applied uniformly, and validly clarified that a Ph.D. was not mandatory.

The Appellant thereafter preferred the present intra-court appeal.

Whether Respondent No. 5’s selection was liable to be set aside on the ground that the Appellant possessed a Ph.D. and was allegedly more meritorious?

Whether the corrigendum impermissibly altered the eligibility criteria during the recruitment process, contrary to the principle in Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court?

Whether the Appellant acquired a legitimate expectation or vested right to appointment merely because he was shortlisted and participated in the presentation and interview?

Whether the Appellant, having participated in the selection process without objection, was barred by acquiescence from challenging the corrigendum?

The Court applied the principle that comparative merit must be assessed according to the criteria expressly prescribed in the advertisement and applicable recruitment rules; possession of an additional qualification does not, by itself, create a preferential right unless the governing criteria so provide.

It considered Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court & Ors., 2025 (2) SCC 1, concerning alteration of recruitment criteria after commencement of the recruitment process, but held that the corrigendum merely implemented the UGC’s extension of the date from which a Ph.D. became mandatory.

The Court also acknowledged the principles in R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anmol Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand that public employment must be governed by merit and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, while observing that merit must be determined by the applicable selection criteria.

Mere shortlisting and participation in an interview confer no vested right to appointment.

Participation without objection may amount to acquiescence, preventing a later challenge to the selection process.

The Court held that the corrigendum expressly removed the mandatory requirement of a Ph.D. and was uniformly applicable to all candidates.

Consequently, the Appellant’s possession of a Ph.D. could not, absent any stipulation in the advertisement, addendum, or corrigendum, establish superior comparative merit or require preference over Respondent No. 5.

The corrigendum was issued pursuant to the UGC’s extension of the date for mandatory Ph.D. qualification and did not exclude the Appellant; rather, he was shortlisted and permitted to participate in the selection process.

His participation in the presentation and interview did not create any legitimate expectation or vested right to appointment.

Further, since he participated without challenging the corrigendum, he had acquiesced in the process and could not subsequently assail it.

It held that Respondent No. 5’s selection was neither arbitrary nor violative of Articles 14 or 16 merely because the Appellant possessed a Ph.D.; the corrigendum validly clarified that a Ph.D. was not mandatory and did not unlawfully alter the recruitment process.

Shortlisting and participation did not confer any right to appointment, and the Appellant was also barred by his acquiescence from challenging the corrigendum.

The appeal was dismissed, pending applications were disposed of, and there was no order as to costs.