Possession of 'Bhang' Is Not an Offence Under the NDPS Act as It Falls Outside the Definition of Cannabis

The appellant was apprehended by a police patrolling party on October 17, 2000, near Chaibasa Bus Stand while carrying a briefcase containing 12 polythene packs of a substance suspected to be Ganja, weighing approximately 11 kg

A case was registered under Sections 20 and 22 of the NDPS Act, and the Trial Court convicted the appellant on July 20, 2009, sentencing him to 7 years R.I. and a fine of ₹50,000

Crucially, the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report dated November 29, 2002 (Exhibit-6), opined that the seized material consisted of broken vegetable leaves/flowery substances identified as "Bhang," not "Ganja"

Section 2(iii) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985, which defines "cannabis (hemp)" as charas, ganja (flowering or fruiting tops), or any mixture thereof, specifically excluding seeds and leaves when not accompanied by the tops

Judicial precedents including Roshan Kumar Mishra v. State of Karnataka (2022) and Arjun Singh v. State of Haryana (2004), which established that "Bhang" is excluded from the ambit of the NDPS Act as it is not derived from the flowering or fruiting tops of the plant

The court examined the statutory definition of cannabis under Section 2(iii) and noted that while charas and ganja are strictly regulated, the Act excludes leaves and seeds from the definition of ganja unless they are accompanied by the flowering/fruiting tops

Since the FSL report (Exhibit-6) explicitly identified the seized substance as "Bhang" and not "Ganja," the court found that the material did not meet the legal threshold for a prohibited narcotic drug under the NDPS Act

The court further reasoned that since there was no allegation of "cultivation" (punishable under Section 20(a)) but only "possession," and because "Bhang" is not listed as a prohibited drug or drink in the Act or via State notification, the prosecution failed to establish a statutory offence

Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated July 20 and 23, 2009, respectively, were set aside. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was discharged from his bail bonds