Post-conviction suspension of sentence for acid attack requires stricter scrutiny and objective assessment of exceptional circumstances.

The applicants were convicted on 29.11.2025 by the Sessions Judge, Dharamshala, under Sections 326-A and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC for an acid attack on the victim.

They were sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment.

The applicants sought suspension of sentence pending appeal, arguing: (i) an unexplained delay of seven months in filing the FIR; (ii) medical evidence suggesting the injuries were accidental laboratory burns; and (iii) discrepancies regarding whether the incident occurred at the door or inside the laboratory.

The State opposed the application, citing the victim's explanation for the delay, forensic reports confirming sulphuric acid on the victim’s clothes, and the gravity of the offence.

The court primarily applied Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding to Section 430 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), which requires the appellate court to record reasons in writing for suspending a sentence.

It relied on Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. (2024), which held that while suspension is the rule for short-term sentences, it is an exception for serious offences like acid attacks that strip a victim of their basic human rights.

It further applied Kishori Lal v. Rupa (2004), establishing that post-conviction bail requires a more rigorous objective assessment than pre-trial bail.

The Court reasoned that once a conviction is recorded, the presumption of innocence no longer survives, and the parameters for bail shift significantly.

It noted that the arguments raised by the applicants regarding delay in FIR and medical contradictions involve re-appreciation of evidence, which is reserved for the final hearing of the appeal rather than the interim stage of suspension.

The Court emphasized the "extreme gravity" of Section 326-A IPC, noting it affects bodily integrity and human dignity.

Applying the Shivani Tyagi precedent, the Court observed that the applicants had only served 7–8 months of their ten-year sentence, which did not justify exercise of discretionary power for suspension at this stage.

The application was dismissed, with the Court clarifying that these observations would not impact the final merits of the criminal appeal.