Post-retirement departmental proceedings for events older than four years are legally impermissible and barred by limitation.

The petitioner retired as a Routine Clerk from the Bihar State Khadi and Village Industries Board ("the Board") on 31.12.2021 after 38 years of service.

In 2010, he had undergone a departmental proceeding resulting in multiple penalties; however, the punishment order noted that separate action would follow regarding alleged financial irregularities in a training program after audit by a Chartered Accountant.

Post-retirement, while the petitioner sought his gratuity (which was sanctioned but not paid), the Board initiated a fresh departmental proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950, via a memo of charge dated 26.09.2023, regarding events from 2008-09.

1. Whether a departmental proceeding can be kept pending regarding certain charges while being concluded for others by inflicting punishment.

2. Whether the initiation of a fresh departmental proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules after superannuation is barred by the four-year limitation period.

Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950, specifically proviso (a)(ii), which prohibits the institution of departmental proceedings against a retired employee in respect of an event that took place more than four years before such institution.

The Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2005, regarding the mandatory procedures for disciplinary actions.

The precedent State of Bihar & Ors. v. Mohd. Idris Ansari [AIR 1995 SC 1853], which establishes that the four-year bar is absolute for post-retirement proceedings.

The Court rejected the Board's argument that the 2023 proceeding was a mere "continuance" of the 2010 proceeding. If it were a continuance, there would be no necessity for a fresh memo of charge.

The Court observed that service jurisprudence does not allow an authority to split charges, concluding some and keeping others "pending" indefinitely.

Since the alleged financial irregularities occurred prior to 2009 and the fresh memo of charge was issued in 2023 (well beyond the four-year window following the petitioner’s 2021 retirement), the proceeding was held to be "hopelessly barred" by Rule 43(b)(a)(ii).

The Court further noted that the Board failed to show the mandatory State Government sanction required under Rule 43(b) for instituting such proceedings.

The Court quashed the memo of charge dated 26.09.2023 and allowed the writ petition.

The Board was directed to ensure payment of the remaining gratuity amount with statutory interest under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, within eight weeks.