Posters calling Supreme Court judgment “denial of justice” amount to protected dissent, Karnataka High Court rules in quashing FIR

A suo motu police complaint alleged that posters or slogans had been placed on roadside walls after an unnamed Supreme Court judgment.

The material reportedly described the judgment as a “denial of justice” and called for raising a voice for justice; it was also associated with the Popular Front of India.

The police registered Crime No. 222/2019 against the 13 petitioners under Sections 153A, 295A and 120B of the IPC and Section 3 of the Karnataka Open Place Disfigurement Act, 1951.

The petitioners sought to quash the FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC.

Whether the allegations in the complaint disclosed offences under Sections 153A and 295A of the IPC, warranting continuation of the FIR.

Whether the FIR and resulting proceedings should be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC.

The Court considered Sections 153A, 295A and 120B of the IPC, Section 3 of the Karnataka Open Place Disfigurement Act, 1951, and the High Court’s inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC.

It relied on Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 4 SCC 156, for the protection of lawful dissent and criticism under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21, subject to the reasonable restrictions in Article 19(2), and for assessing the general impact of words on reasonable people in significant numbers.

It also referred to Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431, and related authorities concerning Section 153A.

The Court stated that the alleged slogans did not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 153A and 295A; in discussing Section 153A, it also stated that an ingredient of sedition against the State was required.

Applying those principles, the Court treated the alleged words—describing the judgment as a denial of justice and calling for a voice for justice—as dissent concerning a judicial decision, rather than speech shown to promote disharmony or enmity between religious groups.

It concluded that the complaint did not disclose the ingredients of Sections 153A or 295A and that the alleged expression fell within the protection of Articles 19 and 21.

The Court therefore considered the case appropriate for exercise of its Section 482 power.