Pre-existing Gair Haqdar tenancy rights survive MPLRC and confer Bhumiswami status under Section 158(d)(ii).

Respondent No. 1, Vishwanath Singh, claimed rights over land comprised in old Khasra No. 386/new Khasra Nos. 630 and 631, measuring approximately 1.19 acres.

His father allegedly possessed the land from the pre-Independence period, using part of it for residential purposes and cultivating the remaining portion.

The claim was based on long possession, historical revenue entries, municipal assessment records, and alleged rights as a Gair Haqdar Kashtkar under the Rewa State Land Revenue and Tenancy Code, 1935.

The Sub-Divisional Officer, Huzur, allowed the claim on 29 December 1993 and directed that the respondent’s name be recorded as Bhumiswami.

The Collector affirmed the decision on 5 March 2002.

Subsequently, the Commissioner, exercising revisional jurisdiction, directed that 0.19 acre be recorded in the name of the Public Works Department on 1 February 2005.

The Board of Revenue thereafter set aside the SDO’s order, principally on the ground that the State had not been afforded an effective opportunity of hearing, and directed that the land be recorded in the name of the PWD.

The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition on 22 July 2022, restored the orders of the SDO and Collector, and held that the revisional power had been exercised after an unreasonable delay of approximately 11–12 years.

The State filed the present writ appeal with a delay of 855 days.

Whether the State’s delay of 855 days in filing the writ appeal ought to be condoned on the ground of sufficient cause?

Whether the respondent or his predecessor acquired rights as a Gair Haqdar tenant and consequently Bhumiswami rights under Section 158(1)(d)(ii) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, read with Section 57(4) of the Rewa State Land Revenue and Tenancy Code, 1935?

Whether Section 57(1) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 could be invoked to defeat rights allegedly subsisting before the commencement of the Code?

Whether the Commissioner and Board of Revenue validly exercised revisional jurisdiction after an inordinate delay of approximately 11–12 years?

Whether the disputed land was Government/PWD land or land acquired or required for a Government or public purpose so as to exclude the respondent’s claim under Section 158(1)(d)(ii)?

The Court applied Section 57(1) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, which declares State ownership over lands but expressly preserves rights subsisting at the commencement of the Code.

Section 57(2), as it stood when the proceedings were initiated in 1993, conferred jurisdiction on the State Government to decide disputes concerning rights claimed against the State.

Section 158(1)(d)(ii) confers Bhumiswami status on a person holding land in the Vindhya Pradesh region as a Gair Haqdar tenant, provided the land is not a grove, tank, or land acquired or required for Government or public purposes.

Section 57(4) of the Rewa State Land Revenue and Tenancy Code, 1935 entitled a Gair Haqdar tenant occupying land with the express or implied consent of the competent authority or recorded holder to be recorded as a Pattedar tenant and obtain a patta.

The Court held that a written patta was not indispensable where long and undisturbed possession established implied consent.

It also relied on Mohammad Kavi v. Fatima Bai Ibrahim, 1997 (6) SCC 71, and the Full Bench decision in Ranveer Singh (since deceased) through LRs Kishori Singh v. State of M.P., 2010 (4) MPLJ 178, for the principle that suo motu revisional powers must be exercised within a reasonable period.

The Court found that the historical revenue records, settlement entries, municipal assessment, continuous cultivation, and long possession established an uninterrupted chain of possession and recorded rights in favour of the respondent and his father.

The absence of a formal patta did not defeat the claim because Section 57(4) of the Rewa Code recognised express or implied consent, and the prolonged, undisturbed possession supported an inference of implied consent.

The proviso to Section 57(1) of the MPLRC protected rights existing before the Code came into force; therefore, the State could not rely on the general declaration of State ownership to extinguish the respondent’s pre-existing rights.

The Court further held that mere mutation in favour of the PWD did not establish Government ownership.

The land had not been shown to have been acquired for, or actually occupied by, the PWD, nor was it proved to be required for a Government or public purpose.

Finally, the Commissioner and Board of Revenue had interfered with the SDO’s order after an unreasonable delay of approximately 11–12 years, rendering the exercise of revisional power impermissible under the applicable reasonable-time principle.

The Court therefore found no error in the Single Judge’s interference with the revisional orders.

On the merits, the Division Bench held that the respondent’s pre-existing rights and status as a Gair Haqdar tenant were protected and that he had acquired Bhumiswami rights under Section 158(1)(d)(ii) of the MPLRC read with Section 57(4) of the Rewa Code.

The revisional orders of the Commissioner and Board of Revenue were therefore unsustainable, and the order of the learned Single Judge restoring the SDO’s order dated 29 December 1993 and the Collector’s order dated 5 March 2002 was upheld.

Writ Appeal No. 539 of 2025 was dismissed.