Pre-grant-in-aid service counts for notional pay fixation and consequential benefits, but not salary arrears.

The petitioners, employees of an aided polytechnic who had retired, sought consideration of their representation requesting service benefits by reckoning their service from their respective appointment dates, including the period before their posts were admitted to grant-in-aid.

They relied on the decisions in W.P. No. 21216/2014 and W.A. No. 2476/2015 and connected matters.

The State submitted that the relief was governed by the appellate court’s clarification in paragraph 61 of its judgment.

Whether the respondents should consider the petitioners’ representation seeking service benefits by counting their pre-grant-in-aid service?

Whether pre-grant-in-aid service may be reckoned for consequential service benefits, and, if so, whether it entitles the petitioners to salary arrears for that period?

The Court applied the clarification in paragraph 61 of the judgment in W.A. No. 2476/2015 and connected matters.

Under that clarification, service rendered before a post is admitted to grant-in-aid may be counted for notional pay fixation as on the date of admission to grant-in-aid and for consequential benefits, including pension and other service benefits; the State is not liable for salary arrears or other monetary benefits for the pre-grant period.

The appellate court’s reasoning referred to Annexure-I of the Rules, 1999, under which the institution’s management remains liable for salary and other benefits until the post is admitted to grant-in-aid.

The Court treated paragraph 61 of the appellate judgment as defining both the scope and limits of the petitioners’ entitlement.

It therefore directed the respondents to reckon service from the petitioners’ appointment dates, including pre-grant-in-aid service, only for benefits flowing from that clarification.

This did not make the State liable for salary arrears or other monetary benefits for the pre-grant period.

Respondents 1 and 2 were directed to reckon the petitioners’ service from their appointment dates for the benefits specified in paragraph 61 of the appellate judgment, and to complete consideration and pass appropriate orders within six months.