Pre-trial amendment of plaint is permissible to seek alternative reliefs if foundational facts remain consistent.

The Petitioner, a tenant of two rooms in Pune, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Respondent No. 3 (Developer) for redevelopment. The Petitioner claimed the original agreement promised a 600 sq.ft. unit and transit rent, but alleged the Developer forged pages of the MOU to reflect a smaller area and refused payment.

The Petitioner initially filed a suit seeking a declaration that the development permissions were void due to fraud and that the MOU was illegal.

After a failed attempt to withdraw the suit with liberty to file afresh, the Petitioner sought to amend the plaint to instead seek specific performance of the "true" terms of the MOU and delete the prayers challenging the building permissions.

The Trial Court rejected the substantive amendments, holding they would inconsistently alter the nature of the suit from declaration to specific performance.

1. Whether the proposed amendment to seek specific performance of an MOU, previously alleged to be forged, materially alters the nature and character of the suit.

2. Whether the Petitioner can take inconsistent or alternative pleas at the pre-trial stage if the foundational facts remain the same.

The court applied Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC, emphasizing that all amendments necessary for determining the real controversy should be allowed unless they cause irreparable prejudice.

Statement identifying the principle from Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and M/s. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram that procedural errors are rectifiable if they do not injure accrued rights.

Regarding inconsistent pleas, the court cited G. Nagamma v. Siromanamma and B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai, which hold that alternative and even inconsistent reliefs are permissible provided they are not "mutually destructive."

Statement on the doctrine derived from Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Pvt. Ltd. regarding the discretionary power to allow amendments even if limitation is a factor.

The High Court observed that the learned Civil Judge misconstrued the amendment as a total conversion of the suit. The Court reasoned that the foundational facts—the tenancy, the redevelopment intent, and the dispute over the promised 600 sq.ft. area—were already present in the original plaint.

Citing Abdul Rehman v. Mohd. Ruldu, the Court noted that if the factual matrix remains consistent, a change in the relief sought does not change the "nature of the suit".

The Court found the amendment was not "mutually destructive" because the Petitioner was now narrowing his challenge to specific pages of the MOU (pages 3 and 4) rather than the whole document, seeking to enforce what he claimed were the actual agreed terms. Since the trial had not commenced, a liberal approach was warranted to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

The High Court set aside the Trial Court's order and allowed the Writ Petition, directing the Petitioner to carry out the amendments within four weeks and granting the Respondents liberty to file an additional written statement while leaving the question of limitation open for trial.