Preference for appointment as Kotwar is not a hereditary right and is subject to comparative suitability.

The Appellant’s father, the former Kotwar of Village Ganiyari, passed away in 2010

Following the death of a subsequent appointee, the Tahsildar initiated a fresh selection process in 2018. Respondent No. 6 was appointed as Kotwar, a decision the Appellant challenged through successive appeals

The Sub-Divisional Officer initially remanded the matter due to procedural irregularities, but the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue set aside that remand, affirming Respondent No. 6’s appointment

The Appellant filed a writ petition (WPS No. 7497 of 2023) alleging violation of Rule 4 of the Kotwar Rules, which was dismissed by the Single Judge on 28.02.2026

The Appellant then preferred this intra-court appeal

1. Whether the appointment of a Kotwar can be claimed as a hereditary right or a matter of preference by the kin of a deceased Kotwar under Rule 4(2) of the Kotwar Rules

2. Whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, can reappreciate factual findings regarding the comparative suitability and character of candidates for a statutory post

The Court applied Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, and the Rules framed thereunder, which establish Kotwar as a statutory post regulated exclusively by law rather than heritage

The Court relied on Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate (2019) to define the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226, focusing on the decision-making process rather than the merits of the decision

Further, it applied the doctrine from Union of India v. M.V. Mohanan Nair (2020), which mandates judicial restraint regarding concurrent findings of fact by statutory authorities unless vitiated by perversity or patent illegality

The Court reasoned that the post of Kotwar is not hereditary; any preference given to a relative under Rule 4(2) is discretionary and applies only when "other things are equal"

In this case, the "other things" were not equal: the Appellant was 54 years old (nearing the superannuation age of 60), possessed lower educational qualifications (Class III), and had criminal antecedents involving preventive bonds under Sections 107 and 116(3) of the CrPC

In contrast, Respondent No. 6 was younger (34 years), better educated (Class V), and had a clean record

The Court found that the Tahsildar had followed the procedure, including character verification and Gram Sabha consultation

Consequently, there was no "Wednesbury unreasonableness" or procedural impropriety in the authorities' assessment of comparative suitability

The Division Bench affirmed the Single Judge's order and dismissed the writ appeal, holding that the selection process was fair, reasonable, and in accordance with the statutory framework. All pending interlocutory applications were disposed of