Preference for relatives in Kotwar appointments is discretionary and yields to objective suitability and character requirements.

The petitioner’s father, Khelan Das Panika, served as the Kotwar of Village Ganiyari until his death in 2010.

Following a series of litigations and the death of a subsequent appointee, Laxman Singh, the Tahsildar issued a fresh proclamation in 2018 to fill the vacancy.

Both the petitioner and respondent No. 6 applied.

Respondent No. 6 was appointed after a police verification revealed no criminal record, whereas the petitioner had two *Istigasha* cases registered under Sections 107 and 116 of the Cr.P.C.

The Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) initially remanded the matter, but the Commissioner and later the Board of Revenue upheld the appointment of respondent No. 6.

The petitioner challenged the Board of Revenue's order dated 23.06.2023, which dismissed his review application on the grounds that no error was apparent on the face of the record.

Whether the preference for a "near relative" of an ex-Kotwar under Rule 4(2) constitutes a vested or hereditary right to appointment.

Whether criminal antecedents and advanced age are valid grounds for the appointing authority to determine "unsuitability" under the Kotwar Rules.

Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact by revenue authorities in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

The court primarily applied Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, and the Rules framed thereunder, which define a Kotwar as a statutory civil servant rather than a hereditary position.

Rule 2 mandates that an appointee must be of "good character and antecedents" and not "unfit through infirmity."

Rule 4(2) provides that preference *may* be given to a near relative of the ex-Kotwar only "other things being equal."

The court relied on *Union of India v. M.V. Mohanan Nair* regarding the supervisory nature of Article 226.

The court relied on *Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate* regarding the limited scope of judicial review over administrative actions.

The court reasoned that the post of Kotwar is a statutory office, not a hereditary entitlement; thus, any preference under Rule 4(2) is discretionary and conditional upon the candidate meeting all other eligibility criteria.

Upon examining the record, the court found that "other things" were not equal: the petitioner was 54 years old (near the superannuation age of 60) and had multiple criminal antecedents—specifically peace-bond proceedings—which disqualified him under the "good character" requirement of Rule 2.

Conversely, respondent No. 6 was younger (34 years), more educated (Class V vs. Class III), and had a clean police record.

The court held that the comparative assessment of suitability belongs to the administrative authority and, absent perversity or manifest illegality, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Tahsildar or the Board of Revenue.

The court affirmed the Board of Revenue’s orders, noting they were well-reasoned and lacked any error apparent on the face of the record.

The writ petition was dismissed, and the appointment of respondent No. 6 as permanent Kotwar was upheld.