Preventive detention based on a single criminal case cannot substitute ordinary criminal law for maintaining public order.

The petitioner, Maheshbhai Girishbhai Valand, challenged a detention order dated 06.02.2026 issued by the Police Commissioner, Vadodara, under Section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act (PASA), 1985

The detention was based on a single criminal case registered on 10.01.2026 involving the Gujarat Prohibition Act, where the petitioner was accused of being a "bootlegger"

At the time of the hearing, the petitioner was detained in Bhavnagar District Jail and had already been granted regular bail by the trial court in the underlying criminal case

1. Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority under the PASA Act, 1985, is legally sustainable in the absence of evidence showing a disturbance to "public order"

2. Whether the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was reached mechanically and without application of mind regarding the distinction between "law and order" and "public order"

The Court applied Section 3 of the PASA Act, 1985, which empowers detention to prevent activities prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order," and Section 2(b), which defines a "bootlegger"

It relied on the landmark principles established in *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others* (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which stipulate that preventive detention is an extraordinary measure to be used sparingly and is an exception to the right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution

Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principle from *Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana* and *Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar*, holding that preventive detention should not be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal law or to circumvent bail orders unless the activities squarely fall within the definition of disturbing public order

The Court examined whether the petitioner’s classification as a "bootlegger" based on a single FIR justified a detention order.

It reasoned that for an act to warrant preventive detention, it must affect "public order" rather than mere "law and order"

The Court found that the Detaining Authority failed to produce material showing how the petitioner’s alleged activities disturbed public health, tranquility, or the community at large

Highlighting that the petitioner had already been granted bail by a competent court, the Bench noted that the State should have moved for cancellation of bail if it feared further offences, rather than resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention

The Court concluded that the subjective satisfaction was reached erroneously as the alleged offences had no direct bearing on the maintenance of public order

The Court held that the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was not legal or valid as the material on record was insufficient to prove a threat to public order

The Court directed that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other legal matter