Preventive detention based on ordinary criminal cases without impact on public order is unsustainable in law.

The Petitioner, Parmit @ Parmitbhai, was preventively detained by an order dated 01.02.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Surat, under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 ("PASA Act").

The detaining authority classified him as a "dangerous person" based on two criminal cases registered against him on 14.01.2026 at Chowkbazar Police Station involving offences under Sections 115(2), 125(A), 351(3), 352, 54, and 296(B) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 135 of the G.P. Act.

The Petitioner had already been granted bail in these cases by the concerned court.

The Petitioner challenged the validity of this detention order through his brother.

Whether the detention order passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of powers under the PASA Act, 1985 is sustainable in law or lacks subjective satisfaction.

Whether the criminal antecedents of the detenue were sufficient to establish that his activities were prejudicial to the "maintenance of public order" as opposed to mere "law and order".

The Court primarily applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as an individual who habitually commits specific IPC/BNS chapters or Arms Act offences.

It relied on the principle that preventive detention is an "extraordinary power" to be used sparingly and only in rare cases, as established in *Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu*.

Furthermore, it applied the precedent from *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala* (AIR 2025 SC 2868) and *Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana*, which holds that where ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) provides sufficient remedy, the State should not resort to extraordinary preventive detention measures.

The Court found that the Detaining Authority wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the Petitioner's activities disturbed "public order".

The Court reasoned that the two specific criminal cases registered against the Petitioner did not have a sufficient bearing on the maintenance of public order to justify the curtailment of liberty under an extraordinary statute.

The Court emphasized that when an accused is enlarged on bail by a competent court, the State must exercise "great caution" and typically seek cancellation of bail rather than circumventing ordinary criminal procedure via preventive detention.

Consequently, the material on record was deemed insufficient to prove that the Petitioner's activities were "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order".

The Court held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was not legal or valid because the alleged activities did not affect public order.

The Court directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case, and made the Rule absolute.