Preventive detention cannot be based on ordinary law and order offenses without impact on public order.

The petitioner, classified as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA Act), was preventively detained following an order dated 27.01.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Surat

The detention order was based on two criminal cases registered against him at Pandesara Police Station between December 2023 and December 2025 involving charges under the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), and the Gujarat Police Act

The petitioner challenged the detention through a friend, arguing that there was no material evidence to show a disturbance of public order and that the order was passed mechanically without application of mind

1. Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of powers under the PASA Act, 1985, is sustainable in law

2. Whether the criminal activities alleged against the detenue constitute a breach of "public order" as opposed to a mere "law and order" problem

The court primarily applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or abets specific offences under the IPC or Arms Act over a successive three-year period

The court also relied on Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution regarding preventive detention and the precedent set by the Supreme Court in *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others* (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which emphasizes that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and only in rare cases where ordinary law is insufficient

Furthermore, the court referred to the principle that when an accused is granted bail by a competent court, the state should seek cancellation of bail rather than resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention

The Court examined whether the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was supported by the material on record.

It noted that the detention was based on only two criminal cases, in both of which the detenue had already been granted bail by the concerned court

The Court reasoned that these offences, while potentially criminal, did not have a sufficient nexus to the maintenance of "public order" or public tranquility to justify the curtailment of personal liberty under PASA

Following the Supreme Court's mandate in *Dhanya M.* and *Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana*, the Court found that the Detaining Authority failed to explain why ordinary criminal law—such as applying for the cancellation of bail—was insufficient to address the petitioner’s activities

Consequently, the Court held that the authority's subjective satisfaction was wrongly arrived at

The Court held that the alleged activities did not adversely affect the maintenance of public order, rendering the detention order illegal and invalid

The Court directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case, and made the Rule absolute