Preventive detention cannot be ordered based on isolated criminal cases without evidence of prejudice to public order.

The petitioner, Mr. Dhanraj Savairam Raj, through his brother, challenged a detention order dated 17.02.2026 issued by the Police Commissioner, Vadodara City.

The petitioner was branded a "bootlegger" under Section 2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA Act), following a single FIR registered on 23.09.2025 at Kapurai police station for offenses under Sections 65(a)(e), 81, and 116(B) of the Prohibition Act.

The petitioner had already been granted bail by the concerned court regarding this offense.

At the time of the hearing, the petitioner was detained in Rajkot Central Jail.

1. Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority under the PASA Act, 1985, is legally sustainable based on the material available.

2. Whether the activities of the petitioner allegedly as a "bootlegger" reached the threshold of being "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order".

The Court applied the definition of "bootlegger" under Section 2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985.

It also relied heavily on the constitutional limitations of preventive detention under Article 22(3)(b) and the principle that such power must be used sparingly and as an exception to Article 21.

The Court followed the precedent of *Dhaya M. v. State of Kerala and others* (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which established that preventive detention should not be used merely to "clip the wings" of an accused involved in a criminal prosecution where ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) provides sufficient remedy.

The Court examined whether the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was grounded in material that demonstrated a threat to "public order" as opposed to mere "law and order."

The Court noted that the detention was based primarily on a single criminal case.

It reasoned that the commission of an offense under the Prohibition Act does not automatically equate to a disturbance of public order.

The Court observed that since the petitioner had already been granted bail by a competent court, the State should have moved for cancellation of bail if they apprehended further offenses, rather than resorting to the extraordinary measure of preventive detention.

The bench concluded that the Detaining Authority failed to show how the petitioner's activities affected public health or tranquility at large.

The Court allowed the petition and quashed the detention order dated 17.02.2026.

It directed that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith unless required in any other case.

Consequently, the application for temporary bail was disposed of as infructuous.