Preventive detention cannot be resorted to for ordinary law and order issues lacking impact on public order.

The petitioner was detained by an order dated 01/02/2026 passed by the Police Commissioner, Vadodara, under Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 ("PASA Act").

The detention was based on the petitioner's classification as an "immoral traffic offender" following the registration of two FIRs between October 2023 and December 2025 involving Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prohibition) Act and relevant IPC sections.

The petitioner, who had already been granted regular bail in these predicate offenses, challenged the detention order's legality via a friend.

1. Whether the activities of the petitioner as an "immoral traffic offender" under Section 2(g) of the Act of 1985 were sufficient to establish a disturbance of "public order" as opposed to "law and order"

2. Whether the Detaining Authority's subjective satisfaction was legally sustainable when the petitioner had already been granted bail in the underlying criminal cases

The court applied Section 2(g) of the PASA Act, 1985, which defines an "immoral traffic offender" as one who habitually commits offenses under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956.

It relied heavily on the precedent Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which establishes that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly as an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution.

The court further applied the principle that if ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) provides sufficient remedy, the extraordinary measure of preventive detention should not be bypassed.

The Court examined whether the two registered cases provided a nexus to a breach of "public order" rather than mere "law and order" violations.

It noted that the petitioner was already enlarged on bail by a competent court.

Citing the Supreme Court’s observations in Dhanya M. and Ameena Begum, the Court reasoned that the state should have moved for the cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal law if the petitioner posed a threat, rather than resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention.

The Court found that the material available did not indicate how the petitioner’s alleged immoral trafficking activities affected the society at large or the maintenance of public tranquility to a degree justifying detention.

Consequently, the authority's subjective satisfaction was found to be mechanical and lacking application of mind.

The petition was allowed, and the detention order dated 01/02/2026 was quashed.

The Court directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith unless required in any other case.