Preventive detention cannot be resorted to for ordinary law and order issues triable under criminal law.

The petitioner, Vishal alias Jadiyo Dharmnath Yadav, was preventively detained by an order dated 01.02.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Surat City.

The detention was based on his status as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA), following the registration of two criminal cases on 14.01.2026 at Chawkbazar Police Station involving various sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and the G.P. Act.

The detenue had already been granted bail by the concerned court in these offences.

The petitioner challenged the detention through his mother, alleging a lack of material to prove a disturbance to public order.

1. Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority under the Act of 1985 is sustainable in law based on the provided material.

2. Whether the activities of the detenue, categorized as a "dangerous person," truly reached the threshold of being "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" as opposed to mere "law and order" issues.

The court primarily applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or attempts offences under specific chapters of the IPC/BNS or Arms Act.

It further relied on the Supreme Court precedent Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which emphasizes that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and is an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution.

Additionally, the court cited Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana and Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, establishing that when ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) provides sufficient means to address apprehensions, extraordinary preventive detention should not be resorted to.

The court examined the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority and found it flawed.

It observed that the authority relied on only two criminal cases to conclude that the petitioner’s activities were prejudicial to "public order".

The court reasoned that these specific offences did not have a sufficient bearing on the maintenance of public order to justify the curtailment of personal liberty.

Applying the principles from Dhanya M., the court noted that the State should have moved for the cancellation of the petitioner's bail under ordinary criminal law if it perceived a threat, rather than circumventing standard procedure through preventive detention.

The court determined that the material on record was insufficient to prove that the petitioner’s actions affected the society at large or the "even tempo of life" required to invoke PASA.

It held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was not legal or valid as the alleged activities did not cross the threshold from a "law and order" problem to a "public order" problem.

The court directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case, and made the Rule absolute.