Preventive detention cannot be resorted to for ordinary law and order issues without affecting public order.

The petitioner, Sachin Kamleshbhai Patni, was preventively detained by an order dated 03.02.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad.

The grounds for detention relied upon two criminal cases registered against him between 30.11.2024 and 22.10.2025 under various sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and the Gujarat Police Act.

The Detaining Authority classified him as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act (PASA), 1985, asserting his activities were prejudicial to "public order".

The petitioner challenged the validity of this detention through his mother, arguing a lack of material to justify the disturbance of public order.

Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of powers under the PASA Act, 1985, is sustainable in law.

Whether the criminal antecedents of the petitioner provided sufficient material to establish a nexus with the disturbance of "public order" as opposed to "law and order".

The court applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or attempts offences under specific chapters of the IPC/BNS or Arms Act.

It relied on the constitutional safeguards under Article 21 and Article 22(3)(b), emphasizing that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly.

The court further applied the precedent set in Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which established that preventive detention should not be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal law, especially when the State has failed to move for cancellation of bail.

The Court observed that while the petitioner had two FIRs registered against him, he had already been granted bail by the concerned courts in those matters.

The bench reasoned that the Detaining Authority failed to demonstrate how these specific incidents adversely affected the maintenance of "public order" or "public tranquility" at large, rather than being mere "law and order" issues.

Citing Apex Court jurisprudence, the court noted that where ordinary criminal law provides sufficient means to address apprehensions (such as seeking cancellation of bail), resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention is an unjustified circumvention of procedure.

Consequently, the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was found to be reached mechanically and without proper application of mind.

The Court allowed the petition, quashed the detention order dated 03.02.2026, and directed that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith.

Rule was made absolute.