Preventive detention cannot be sustained based on criminal cases which do not adversely affect public order.

The petitioner’s brother (the detenue) was preventively detained by an order dated 06.02.2026 passed by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City.

He was classified as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA Act).

The detention order was based on three criminal cases registered against him under Sections 331(4), 305(A), 54, and 62 of the BNS between September and December 2024.

The petitioner challenged the order, arguing that the offences did not disturb public order and that the detaining authority acted mechanically.

1. Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority under the PASA Act, 1985, is sustainable in law based on the provided material?

2. Whether the activities of the detenue, categorized as a "dangerous person," were truly prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order" as opposed to mere "law and order"?

The Court applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat PASA Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or abets specified offences under the IPC (now BNS) or Arms Act.

The Court relied on the constitutional safeguards under Article 21 and Article 22(3)(b), noting that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly.

Furthermore, it applied the precedent from *Dhaya M. v. State of Kerala and others* (AIR 2025 SC 2868) and *Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana*, which establish that preventive detention should not be used to circumvent ordinary criminal law when the State has failed to move for cancellation of bail.

The Court observed that while three criminal cases were registered against the detenue, he had already been granted bail by the concerned courts in those matters.

The Court found that the Detaining Authority failed to establish a nexus between these individual criminal acts and a breakdown of "public order".

Relying on Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Bench reasoned that since the State did not attempt to cancel the detenue's bail under ordinary criminal law, resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention was unjustified.

The Court concluded that the authority’s subjective satisfaction was incorrectly reached because the offences lacked the requisite impact on public tranquility or social order to justify stripping an individual of their liberty.

The Court held that the material on record was insufficient to prove that the detenue’s activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

Consequently, the Court directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case, and made the Rule absolute.